Johnson’s majority is then far more unstable than it appears. He has until 2024 to convince lifelong Labour voters gone Tory to stay with him. Pragmatically this means delivering Brexit, but one that is closely-aligned to the EU, minimizing the disruption to northern manufacturing that his own statistics predict. At the same time polling has found core Conservative voters would gladly see the Conservatives destroyed to get a ‘proper’ Brexit done. Then there is the Union where to combat the rise of the SNP and Irish Republicans closer EU alignment is needed to minimize disruption and facilitate the argument that Independence for the Scots and Irish, would be more disruptive than Brexit.
These three spheres, which are largely at odds, will compete for Johnson’s attention over the next five years. He will have quite the juggling act if he’s to preserve the Union and the Conservative majority for 2024…and indeed the Conservative party itself, for Farage remains waiting in the wings.
Contents
- The Run down
- Rise of the Gaels
- Scottish National Party conquers Scotland
- Second Independence Referendum?
- Northern Ireland: A border down the Irish sea
- The Democratic Unionist Party gets burned
- Heading towards a Border Poll?
- Defender of the Union?
- Conservative voters would rather see the Conservative party destroyed than Brexit to not happen
- Conservative majority in 2024 or Brexit, or Union? Can you have your cake and eat it?
- The Liberal Democrats dreams are dashed
- The legacy of 2019 on British politics
- Page 48
- A Changing Climate
- Towards 2024
The Run down:
-Scotland has a mandate for a second referendum, however pressure will increase if the SNP win the upcoming Holyrood elections. Johnson can delay, but cannot definitively put this off forever.
-Climate Change was the third most pressing issue for voters of all parties this election, in the future it is likely to become even more central.
-Northern Ireland- a Border Poll in the future is now a more distinct possibility, for the first time there are more Nationalist seats than Unionist.
-Boris Johnson is being pulled in several directions. On the one hand to preserve his new northern voters, who are integral for a Tory majority in 2024, and to preserve the Union by showing that the economic disruption to Brexit will be less than feared/better than these nations going independent, he will make a commitment to protect working rights in a flashy show at the Queen's speech, however these will not be equivalent to the EU's going forward. Likewise a softer Brexit is the most pragmatic way of securing the North for the Conservatives, as Governments forecasts place Brexit as effecting these places the most, and Scotland and Northern Ireland from leaving the Union. However this is balanced by the need to 'Get Brexit Done' in a way that will appease core Conservative voters, who polling has shown would gladly sacrifice the Conservative party if it meant getting Brexit 'done' in a way they deem an actual Brexit. Farage thus looms still on the sidelines. Johnson to this end has already sacrificed the DUP and Union cause somewhat in Northern Ireland through his deal placing a border down the Irish Sea to keep the core Tory voters on board, as well as throw a bone to former-Labour Leave supporters.
-Johnson thus will have to juggle these three competing factors going forward if he wants to not see the end of either the Conservatives chances to win in 2024, the Conservatives as a party generally, or the collapse of the Union. In the years ahead any one of these three issues may come to the fore. What is certain is that the nature of the United Kingdom will be fundamentally changed going forward and it will be dependent on how the Conservatives deal with these three concerns.
Rise of the Gaels
While England and Wales went to the Conservatives this election with Labours historic defeat which i detailed in Part 1, a different picture has emerged among the Scottish and in Northern Ireland that potentially sets up a second constitutional crisis for the United Kingdom, just as it is jumping over the first hurdle of Brexit.
Scottish National Party conquers Scotland
The SNP has seen huge growth, not controlling 80% of Scotlands Westminster seats,
Out of Scotlands 59 seats, 48 have gone to the SNP, colouring Scotland in their yellow on the electoral map with an impressive gain of 13 seats since 2017 when they achieved 35 (still by far the largest party in Scotland). This has come directly at the expense of all unionist parties, with the Conservatives dropping from their 2017 high of 13 seats down to 6, Labour falling from 6 to 1 and the Liberal Democrats managing to retain 4, though in the SNP churn they lost their leader,
Jo Swinson's seat of East Dumbartonshire to the SNP.
This is not though a 'new' phenomena for Scotland. The SNP has dominated Scottish politics since 2015 at Westminster level
when it gained a massive 56 seats, leaving the Liberal Democrats, Labour and the Conservatives on only 1 seat each. Interestingly this was after Scotland had voted to stay in the United Kingdom by
55.30% to 44.70% in its 2014 Independence Referendum. In 2017
this fell to 35 seats
as the unionist parties regained some ground, however this still left the SNP as the largest Scottish Westminster grouping. The increase then this time around will be seen as as reconfirmation that Scotland is politically very different from the rest of the UK, and that there is a mandate for a second independence referendum due to the growth in SNP seats.
Second Independence Referendum?
It is likely though that the real demands for one will begin after the Scottish Parliamentary elections have taken place in 2021.
Scotland uses a form of proportional representation for its Holyrood elections, where voters have two votes. This is known as the 'Additional Member System'. The first is used to vote for an MP based upon Britain's traditional First Past the Post model, there are 73 Holyrood MSPs who are voted in this way. The voter then gets to use their second vote to vote for a party generally, dependent on how many votes a party gets in this section a number of the extra 56 MSP seats will be allocated to them. The idea is to provide a result that more broadly reflects the views of the electorate.
Currently the SNP are by far the largest party in the Scottish Parliament with 62 MSPs. The next largest party is the Scottish Conservatives on 31, Scottish Labour is on 23, Scottish Greens have 6 seats and there are 2 independents. The SNP have been the largest party in Holyrood for the past three elections, and have even managed to get a majority in 2011,
despite the voting system being designed to specifically present that. There is thus a very clear and strong level of support in Scotland for the SNP as a party. However, at the last election, despite having more than double the MSP's of the Scottish Conservatives,
the latter did gain 16 seats, while the SNP lost 6. This growth of 16 seats, mostly at the expense of Labour, and while nowhere near bringing the Scottish Conservatives anywhere near the SNP's number of seats, could be used to make a weak but nagging argument that in 2021 we might see the Scottish people continue to vote for a Unionist party.
If a second independence referendum is essentially a sure-fire thing in the coming years, does this mean that independence is too? Well here, it is more complicated. While in 2014 the referendum gave roughly 10% of the electorate in favour of remaining with the union, much of this was achieved seemingly by David Cameron in the last few weeks going back on his previous opposition to giving Scotland 'Devo-Max' (essentially the promise of powers to almost have complete control over domestic policy in Scotland to the Scottish parliament) and
promising exactly that if Scotland remained in the United Kingdom.
Recently polling has actually shown that since Brexit, support for Scottish independence has grown,
some polls putting it as high as 50%. This isn't of course a sure-fire win for independence supporters, but it shows that clearly the 2014 referendum sorted absolutely nothing, and indeed the situation for the Unionists has deteriorated since, when it should have actually been improving (if the matter had at all been 'put to rest'). The speed at which support for Scottish independence is growing, suggests a very real possibility that Scotland could leave the UK in the next few years. Though an important caveat is that its the independence polls that might best be looked at, the SNP's growing support and dominate place in Scottish politics may also be due to a significant amount of voters not liking the Conservatives under Boris Johnson, or the other unionist parties, being unhappy about Brexit, or liking the SNP as a domestic government for Scotland, and as a shield for Scottish interests at Westminster as opposed to wanting to become fully independent.
What is apparent, is that the SNP is certainly going nowhere as the dominant force in Scottish politics, both at Holyrood and in terms of Scotlands representation at Westminster. The Conservative gains of 2017 have been made apparent as a 'blip' by the SNP, and Labour has not managed to ever recover is Scottish base since its collapse in 2015. In this context Conservatives
like Michael Gove can delay a referendum on the issue, but they haven't really got the political capital to stand on to prevent it indefinitely, particularly if they wish to not damage the UK's international political capital and prestige, nor risk indeed further strengthening support for leaving the UK by acting as a authoritarian power (the kind the SNP argues that Westminster is already) imposing its will upon the Scottish people, playing right into the SNP's hands, instead of letting the Scottish people decide on a Scottish issue.
Northern Ireland- A border down the Irish sea
The simple fact here is that yes,
there will be a border down the Irish Sea. Johnson's Conservatives had essentially ditched the DUP even prior to this election, and reneged on their promise to not have a border, Brexit itself was deemed more important. Johnson's deal factually,
despite some... interesting... interpretations by Johnson himself
(Admits to a border down the Irish sea, then goes back on it later), does as
his own Brexit minister has stated, put a border down the Irish sea
as infrastructure, as well as checks on goods and further red-tape for businesses selling goods to the EU through here (and subsequently those not selling goods to the EU, but the UK's internal market will see some new, if light barriers put up). This remember is a deal
that Theresa May had rejected stating that no British Prime Minister could ever accept, because of this fact.
The Democratic Unionist Party gets burned
Heading towards a Border Poll?
The honest answer is 'not yet'. We'll have to wait and see how Northern Irish politics continue to develop.
They also argue that they lose seats due to the
Unionist parties competing with each other, which splintered their own vote share, meanwhile the Irish nationalist parties cooperated in an 'anti-Brexit' pact in most seats.
However, this election we saw gains made by a third faction- the 'moderates' in the form of the Alliance Party,
who gained 1 seat, previously held by a Unionist independent. The Alliance Party is a cross-community political group, of Catholics, Protestants and Unionists and Republicans. Out of all the parties in Northern Ireland
their vote-share increased the most as 8.8%, the second fastest rise in vote share was from the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), and Irish Nationalist party who gained 3.1%
increase to its vote share. All other parties were below 1.4% and many actually lost vote share. This paints an interesting picture, that overall Nationalist parties have indeed increased their vote share, though there is a new dynamic political force potentially waiting to be unleashed overtime that provides a 'central' ground to the polarizing issue of Northern Ireland's participation in the Union. However, the nationalists are the ones who are both growing in vote share, who the demographics favour more and who already constitute the second and third largest parties in Northern Ireland. So while a Border Poll on if Northern Ireland should become part of the Republic of Ireland is still a fair ways off, the changing political landscape is sliding more towards that direction, than towards the Union. Brexit itself has not at all helped this case.
Defender of the Union?
In keeping with this political pragmatism the Conservative manifesto was not for the rich or the poor,
but to tackle inequalities as it's co-writer has stated. This meant a shift to the left economically to state intervention. So it does not look like the 'child of Thatcher' will be the primary Boris Johnson, however w
e may see it in coming tax-cuts to the working classes. An interesting difference is that Thatcher's economic context was one of high interest rates,
hitting roughly around 4% in the 1980s
(In a PDF format, search the link for a document entitled 'Government borrowing, debt and debt interest: historical statistics and forecasts'), while
Boris Johnson enjoys historically low interest rates of around 0.5%- so interventionism is not incompatible, especially as
Thatcher actually heavily centralized power within the state, just as Johnson's new interventionism will see the state take a more active role. It is important to note though, interest rates fall, but also can rise, and fairly rapidly at that.
It is thus difficult to see long-term what Johnson will do beyond get Brexit done (though how remains to be seen) and secure the former Labour voters by being more economically interventionist, as he will go the way the political wins are blowing- this is the man who on the eve of the Brexit Referendum had written two articles,
one supporting the EU and one supporting Leave. He is no real ideological 'Brexiter'.
In this latter, bearing in mind Johnson is more a pragmatist than ideologue and some clues do emerge- a more comprehensive EU trade deal, which requites closer alignment than the ERG have wished may come to fruition as this is the easiest way to keep the North.
Most deals will have a far more disruptive impact upon the North of England, and the closer aligned to the EU the better. Johnson cannot afford to do a very close alignment due to the haunting specter of the Brexit party, but a straight to WTO terms is now more unlikely that before.
Ivan Rogers disagrees
and argues Johnson will attempt a 'hard' Brexit. But this would be Johnson becoming a Brexit ideologue that he just never has been, pragmatically a 'harder' the deal, the greater the potential for economic disruption that will afflict the North worse, and the more money Johnson's Government will have to throw at the North to mitigate the effects if they want to keep these voters for 2024, not to mention it being the biggest risk to the Union, something Johnson at least pays lip-service to.
Though there is space for a harder Brexit just because of this, if the Government doubles down on its state interventionist manifesto (already will rescue businesses effected by Brexit) and is prepared to bend its previous fiscal rules further, then throwing money at the problem could well be seen as a fair salve for what might be seen as the greater global opportunities of a 'harder' Brexit.
However, again pragmatically this harder Brexit will create a secondary problem- the stability of the Union. A more comprehensive trade deal and closer alignment would be the perfect tool to perhaps take the wind out of the SNP's sails and show Scottish voters that Brexit will not be as bad as feared, with less disruption and less tangible change in the short-term.
Conservative voters would rather see the Conservative party destroyed than Brexit to not happen
So the question is what does Johnson thus risk? A softer brexit and thus Farage rallying the troops and splitting or potentially destroying the Conservative party against a Labour party no longer headed by a divisive leader? Or does he protect the union to the best of his ability as his rhetoric at least implies he wishes to? This is a decision we'll have to wait for, but a good idea of what is to come may be given at the Queen's speech.
What i will directly comment on is the furor around Johnson looking to
place leaving the EU in 2020 into law, while this might give an indication that he has chosen Brexit over the Union, and further is planning to throw money at the north to retain them, rather than work out a more comprehensive deal with the EU, it also is exactly the same tactics he'd used with the EU previously to get a 'new' Withdrawal agreement (or in reality- changes to the one May had made), and also to get MP's to pass it in Parliament,
which they then did. It is thus,
just as much posturing for the coming negotiations, based on the idea that negotiations take as long as the time given to complete, as it is perhaps the indication of where we will end up. It also is to highlight to his domestic audience both northern leave voters and the Conservative core, who both voted leave, and the latter who would sacrifice the Conservative to 'leave', that he will be doing just that.
It is likely indeed in the long-term a Conservative government may attempt to water-down British working rights and protections in the name of gaining a competitive edge in a post-Brexit context. However, the immediate dropping of a commitment Johnson made when first bringing forward his withdrawal agreement to Parliament is perhaps more in keeping with the fact that the Conservative Government does not wish to give any sort of sign that it may commit to any 'further' EU working rights and protections which may be coming in, in 2020 and later
as the EU is set to craft a new 2020 strategy, which arguably a commitment to keep to EU standards would imply. Likewise there is political capital be gained from as the government presenting its own separate workers rights bill, announced during the Queens speech on Thursday,
something the Government has committed to doing. Making it a separate piece of legislation will allow the Conservatives to show clearly to their new northern voters that their rights and protections in the workplace are not being watered down as many fear.
It would be incredibly damaging to Conservative prospects in 2024 if they hope to retain their new voters, to be seen to immediately water down workers rights and protections, In the longer-term of course anything may happen as Britain is able to deviate more fully (and indeed may have to considering the weakness of its negotiating position vis-a-vis other states, its not even clear yet if Britain's economic malaise has been
due to simply Brexit, or something deeper).
Conservative majority in 2024 or Brexit, or Union? Can you have your cake and eat it?
The essential summary of the waters for Johnson to navigate is that he needs to convince these former labour voters that the Conservatives are the party for them if he is to win in 2024, this pulls him towards protecting workers rights, and a softer Brexit.
At the same time, the Conservative party faithful want to see Brexit done, whatever the cost, economic or even at the expense of their own Party. This places Farage as a threat once more and will mean that Johnson has to make a success of Brexit. To this end, working rights to keep on board new northern voters will be enshrined in a flashy new separate bill...but one that can indeed easily be amended or changed later down the line, and that also does not bind the UK to the EU's rolling out of improved workers rights and protections post-2020. Likewise Johnson has also essentially sacrificed the DUP and damaged (though not delivered a killer blow) to Northern Ireland Unionists, as he puts a border down the Irish sea.
To keep the Union intact though, and the best way of convincing Scottish voters to back the Union, is to show that Brexit's economic disruption is either not too bad, or at least is less than an independent Scotland would face. This means again, working rights are protected as the Government are promising, and would argue for a quick and beneficial FTA with the EU that will lessen disruption. The balance here of course is that is cannot be too closely aligned, less he alienate the 'core' Conservative base.
How Johnson balances (or fails to balance) these three competing elements will shape the UK for years to come, the Union is not yet over, but a referendum on its importance is essentially assured in Scotland and later in Northern Ireland. However, the future of the Conservative party both depends paradoxically on convincing northern voters that they were right to trust the Tories, while also convincing its core voters that its done enough on Brexit for them to not rip the party apart. Difficult times ahead.
The Liberal Democrats dreams are dashed
For a party that took a firm Revoke and Remain position, the direct opposite of the Conservatives 'Get Brexit done' their should surely have been some votes in this? Instead we ended up with a Conservative majority able to 'Get Brexit done' in any way Johnson wishes, and the opposition now completely powerless to intervene. What went wrong?
Firstly the big moment was the Brexit Party unilaterally standing down in the 317 existing Conservative seats. With no split right-wing vote, the number of seats the Liberal Democrats
realistically had a chance of winning fell.
This was then compounded by Liberal Democrats and Labour splitting each others vote share in seats where one or the other could clearly have one. The most painful being in
places like Kensington, the site of the Grenfell incident, where the Liberal Democrats had no chance of actually winning, they scoring a mere 9,312 votes, while the Conservatives received 16,768 allowing them to take the seat from Labour who gained 16,618 and so lost by a tiny 150 votes, simply because the Liberal Democrats decided to stand as well. For a party that made its platform about stopping Brexit, to stand in Labour seats there were held by a knife-edge (Labour had only taken the seat by 20 votes in 2017) was never going to go well, it would do nothing but gift the Conservatives the seat.
An equally painful contest was over
Ian Duncan Smith's seat of Chingford and Woodford Green. Here Labour had a high chance of toppling Ian Duncan Smith, so much so that other parties like the Green's stood aside to give Labour a clear shot and indeed they only fell short by 1,262 votes with Labour receiving 22,219 votes and the Conservatives 23,481, meanwhile the Liberal Democrats gained a mere 2,744 votes- a very distant third, but enough to have prevented Labour from taking the seat potentially.
However it was not solely the Liberal Democrats fault.
In constituencies like Dominic Raab's of Esher and Walton, there was a high chance he could have lost the seat. The Liberal Democrats received 45% of the vote share to Raab's 49.4%, Labour only received 4.5%. This meant that Raab remained in place with a hugely reduced majority of simply 2,743 votes. If Labour had stood down it is highly possible the Lib-dems could have seized the seat.
A similar though more complex story
played out in Eastbourne, the Liberal-democrats lost the constituency to the Conservatives by 4,331 votes. Labour gained only 3,848 votes, While there votes added to the Lib-dems would not be enough to win, not competing in that constituency in the first place may have seen a better result.
This is a seat that the Liberal Democrats had no real strategic reason for standing in, it was a waste of campaign resources and at best all that could do was potentially allow the Conservatives to gain the seat back, by splitting Labour's vote. Bearing in mind in 2017 Labour won it from Conservatives by a mere 187 votes, the Liberal Democrats were nowhere near being a viable contender having received only 8% of the vote share in 2017. The seat had
also voted to Leave by 51% in 2016. It could not be clearer that this would be a tight, two-horse race between Labour and the Conservatives, and that all a Liberal Democrat presence would do is increase the chance of the Conservatives taking the seat.
The Liberal Democrats then made a further strategic error. Going back to our Eastbourne example, the result here highlights the second big issue for the Liberal Democrats this election- it was highly likely here even if Labour stood down that the Conservatives would still win, because
the Conservatives on their own had enough, with a reserve of Brexit party votes that may have gone towards the Tories if Labour had decided to stand down as part of a local pact.
The Liberal Democrat strategy was thus in poor shape, they overreached, while standing in seats they had no real chance of winning, gifting the Conservatives MPs they otherwise would not have. Now of course in fairness there is the argument to be made that the Liberal Democrats were attempting to appeal to Conservative remainers, and so no pact with Jeremy Corbyn's Labour party would go down well, but that would not have prevented the party standing down candidates quietly in areas like Kensignton where they were actively facilitating the Conservatives to take it. The issue of course here is also one Vince Cable has recognized, that while the Liberal Democrats
made the mistake of becoming 'zealous' europhiles that alienated them from most, the Conservative remainers would naturally not be drawn to voting for the fourth largest party, if it was seen as simply being a conduit that would let a personally unpopular Corbyn in. That the Liberal Democrats did not foresee this at the time perhaps highlights at best a major gap in their strategy, or at worst an overestimation of what they are capable of achieving as Britain's fourth largest party. That they potentially hoped being a party of extreme remain would be a 'fast track' to rebuilding their party to the heights Clegg achieved before Labour wrested (and has subsequently held) the student vote from them in 2015 was an error that perhaps (as we see in the fears of Liberal Democrat MP's during the campaign) did not take hindsight to become clear.
In terms of leaders, for all of Corbyn's responsibility for Labours defeat - as highlighted in my part 1, Labour's policies were popular (as in the 2017 manifesto, not neccessarily the endless bounty promised in 2019), but his leadership was not, and more so than Brexit is what caused Labour's vote share to collapse, By comparison
Liberal Democratic policies were perceived as underwhelming, with voters not being able to remember what was on offer beyond 'Stop Brexit' (A damning indictment when the Conservatives actively tired to make their manifesto forgettable beyond 'Get Brexit Done'). While Jo Swinson suffered somewhat of the same fate as Corbyn in terms of leadership. During the election polling found that
the more voters were exposed to Jo Swinson (a relative unknown) the less and less they actually liked her. This was not helped by Swinson's mistakes, like being perceived as too trigger happy with nuclear missiles, or again
being mocked for the claim she was a serious third contender for Prime Minister, an ambition that was so unrealistic that even the Lib-Dems dropped it later in the campaign. She was certainly the wrong leader to run a presidential-style campaign around. A campaign that much like the Conservatives online shenanigans (See my article of FullfactUK) attracted controversy, as the Liberal-democrats to try and eat into Labour's vote share
presented a series of dodgy polls and quotes on their leaflets
that essentially misinterpreted their evidence to present the Liberal Democrats as being the constituencies best hope of ousting the Conservatives, even when this was not true.
There will be a lot of soul-searching for the Lib-dems to do given their campaign went so badly wrong. The election has given Labour a historic kicking that they may or may not recover from in 2024, but for the Lib-dems this election has set back the very poor recovery they had in 2017, from their grand fall in 2015. A few more elections like this may indeed see them,
as some commentators like Simon Jenkins are demanding, consigned to the 'dustbin' of history, for doing no more than facilitating a larger Conservative win. The big questions in the near-future must be, how do the Liberal Democrats carve out a niche for themselves? The center of politics has shifted economically left (
as seen by the popularity of Corbyn's core policies, and the Conservatives moving to meet them), but 'progressiveism' is certainly divided at a time when if it is to continue being a successful political position it needs to unify, some of this might indeed be as Simon Jenkin's suggests, not that the Liberal Democrats disband themselves and become the moderates in Labour, but the Liberal Democrats shift to left economically so that they can work with Labour, but act as a needed moderating force, both on elements where Labour's policies go too far, but also on ensuring that Labour is an open progressive force, not where some factions promote intolerance to different rival political views or likewise the Lib-dems act in the same way for the Conservatives, acting in tandem to mediate some of their factions intolerance.
The future of the Liberal Democrats, at least for now, is not as a King-Maker, that time passed in 2015, but in acting as the minor party it is, at least while it finds its footing, and waging asymmetrical political warfare, much as UKIP and the Brexit party did to the Conservatives, successfully able to change their policies without holding any seats, well the Liberal Democrats for now at least have 11. They should be able to be of equal influence if not more, it would require them though to recognizing the political reality, however temporary, that they are not a party of Government. This doesn't mean though they cannot pragmatically sculpt the UK's political divides, so instead of standing in constituencies (like Kensignton, or Chingford and Woodford Green) that they cannot win, scale-back to where you can, do not seek to disrupt the vote share of the Conservatives or Labour when in the views of the Lib-dems at the time the 'worst' option may then win due to the split created, but use the threat of Lib-dem splitting votes to adjust the policies of the big-two, to hold them back from their extremes and so achieve the Liberal-Democrat goals in part or eventually in full.
'I still believe we, as a country, can be warm and generous, inclusive and open and that by working together with our nearest neighbours we can achieve so much more'
These are aims that could and still can be achieved by the Lib-dems adapting the hand they've been dealt since 2015 and exerting pressure to shift the political narrative of the big two towards this. But they must, and i emphasize this again, must give up on the idea so ridiculed at the beginning of the election that the Liberal-Democrats could ever be again a party of Government, or even default king-makers. That time is over in this current political context.
Who knows yet though in the longer term, if Brexit becomes a complete disaster instead of the opportunities promised, there may be space for the Liberal Democrats to wait and see and give the Conservatives a run for their money, the Liberal Democrats greatest strength is they do have the ability, when its expectations are managed sensibly, to reach across the voter divide and hoover up the key voters each side needs to win a majority, while this will likely not result in the Cleggmania that saw them as king-makers, it highlights the UK wide-reach they have, that the third largest party, the SNP, lack.
An interesting note though- if Britain adopted Proportional Representation instead of First Past the Post,
the Liberal Democrats would currently have 70 seats, and no party would have the majority needed to form a government. From this we can see it's not that the center-ground of British politics is politically dead, but Britain's FPTP system means there is no place for a centrist political party to succeed.
The legacy of 2019 on British politics
This election was a race to the bottom, there was no doubt.
Corbyn, Johnson
and
Swinson
(By the end of the election campaign certainly) were all unpopular candidates. The is epitomized in what actually happened to the overall vote share this election. It was not that Johnson caused a Thatcher or Blair-esque landslide for his historic gains in Labour's heartland, but actually that
he only got an extra 270,000 votes or 1.2% from the Conservatives 2017 result. Essentially the Conservatives did not gain anymore supporters. Meanwhile
Labour's vote share dropped by 8% compared to 2017, this means that the Conservatives could essentially win new seats by merely keeping their same vote share due to FPTP constituencies as the Brexit Party and Liberal Democrats ate into their vote share. Essentially the winner of this election was due to the other side being more unpopular, or more divided (for those using a remain-leave lens, interestingly and a testament to how Brexit will continue to potentially dominate British politics in the near future,
only 47% of voters backed 'Brexit' parties, the rest all voted for remain- now while this of course could be for a variety of other things, leavers feeling Labour or the Lib-dems had a better domestic policy or remainers preferring Conservative stewardship, there is clearly a 'Brexit factor' that will continue to be at play, we are not a united country yet and will not be for probably the next decade or more as i talked about in my Part 1).
It all essentially depends now on what Labour does in 2024, if they keep the core policies, change the leadership and keep discipline in their party and manifesto it is fairly certain they'll retake their heartlands in 2024. For the Conservatives though, these results while providing them with a historic majority, may also provide them with a fleeting worry for 2024. It's clear that to get a majority they will need to retain their new northern gains, but Johnson as mentioned earlier has three competing spheres, new norther Conservative voters, traditional Conservative voters and the Union, all of which could prove his downfall next election. It also alludes to the fact that the Conservatives may need to shore up the south, as if their voters have only increased by 270,000 and the north is unstable territory, they could be consigned to minority government or worse fairly easily without sweeping changes.
Page 48
This is an election where Boris Johnson has a majority based on a rather vague manifesto. Beyond the commitment to 'Get Brexit done' and to fulfil his promises for a more interventionist and economically left-wing Government. Not much else is all that clear. He thus has a huge degree of wiggle room over the next five years to do as he pleases while not being bound to many specific manifesto commitments.
However, it is unlikely that Johnson will keep to a 'safe' legislative agenda, sweeping changes are predicted. Not merely with Brexit, but page 48 of the Conservative Manifesto stated;
'After Brexit we also need to look at the broader aspects of our constitution: the relationship between the government, parliament and the courts'
However, clarity of the executive, legislature and courts role is something that the British constitution does need, perhaps even in a written constitution. What we do see so far is Johnson's Government
toying with the idea of an elected House of Lords, an idea pushed for by Dominic Cummings his chief strategist and one that is designed to give more representation to the UK's constituent nations to try and help tackle the rise in support for Irish nationalist parties and Scotland's SNP.
It also is important to note, that for those who fear Johnson will attempt to strengthen the executive at the expense of parliament or the courts, this would be supremely short-sighted. The Conservatives will not be in power forever, indeed 2024 is likely to be a fraught election with the north being the deciding ground and a high chance that five years will not be enough for the Conservatives to hold onto these constituencies, against a resurgent Labour, while appeasing their traditional Brexit-voters and keeping the UK together. This is why i'm not too concerned yet by the potentially ominious sounding reforms to the political constitution, as no party yet is in a comfortable position to soundly enhance themselves in Government, to not have it bite them on the proverbial at the next election. Indeed,
Tony Blair came close to ending the Conservatives as an electoral force, but still the electoral cycle continued.
When it comes to constitutional reforms, the governing party will always eventually reap what they sow and thus i'd expect the Conservatives to either keep it to a minimum or place their trust in further democratization (such as an elected second chamber) rather than artificial ways to increase their power, which under Britain's Westminster Constitution is already massive once a government has a majority. There already is very little the opposition can do to oppose Government plans beyond scrutinize them publicly in preparation for 2024.
One aspect to bear in mind going forward is that the findings of the Electoral Boundaries commission, submitted in 2018
will more than likely be enacted prior to the 2024 election. This cuts the numbers of MPs from 650 down to 600, at the time of its conception it was criticized for the new boundaries potentially favoring the Conservative party, for instance in 2017 with the proposed boundary changes,
Theresa May would actually have won a majority of 14. It is unknown yet given the voter church and the Conservatives need for the north, if Johnson might not rethink on its implementation, particularly as currently it would see his majority effected the most, but do not expect changes (if they come) until the last possible minute prior to 2024.
A Changing Climate
Towards 2024
So with the Conservatives juggling their mutually opposing three spheres, protection of the Union, the necessity of northern voters for a Conservative majority in 2024, and the necessity to deliver a 'proper' Brexit, Johnson's next five years are going to be fraught with peril despite his majority. Indeed even with this majority it is likely that new conflicts will flare up as Conservative MP's rally to one of these three spheres, where success in one risks antagonizing the other two.
'The government will face a new pressure to spend and invest from the party’s new MPs, who will want to show that “getting Brexit done” delivers some tangible results for constituents in their marginal seats. But big spending runs very much against the ideological grain for the Conservative party, and the challenges such seats face after decades of stagnation and neglect cannot realistically be addressed in a single term of government. Voters who discover that Brexit brings little positive change to their lives may soon turn against a party they have long disliked and still distrust.’
Add to this the Conservative core who want a 'real' Brexit more than they care about the Conservative parties continued existence and a Union that while not yet terminal, is certainly going to face some severe questioning over the coming few years and far from heading into the dull certainty a majority usually gives, we're looking at fraught and exciting times in politics with dramatic changes in store for the UK and its union.