The Context: Hartlepool has been lost by Labour to the Conservatives for the first time in 62 years (it's not quite as simple as the current Corbynite vs Blairite argument as to why as I'll explain). The Hartlepool result though is an issue for Labour as the way it was won puts on the line 34-odd other Labour seats- an election in 2023 (or even next year according to some rumors if the Conservatives repeal the Fixed Term act asap) could see Labour well and truly devastated and in danger of going the way of so many other European left-wing parties. It's important to note for Labour that this result is one that comes 11 years into a Conservative government. This is a dire situation for an opposition party. Some commentators are highlighting that on current trend, Hartlepool confirms that the Conservatives 'Blair moment' of 2019 when Labour broke through in 1997 into traditional Conservative areas, is not a Brexit fluke, but indeed the continuation of a long-term sustained trend. For Blair his breakthrough led to 10 further years in power for Labour. For the Conservatives this is very likely too as the shift continues in Labours former Red Wall heartlands. Voter turnout- no excuse for Labour's left or right: One defense of Labour's poor turnout being offered is that many pro-Labour voters chose to stay at home rather than come out in support of the party, and so Labour under Starmer or Corbyn (depending on who you talk to/is trying to spin it) isn't the issue. This however isn't really the case. While indeed the turnout this time was 42.3% compared to 57.9% in 2019 and 59.2% in 2017, the missing 15% would not have made any real dent in the figures, even if they all went and voted for Labour. The Conservatives would still gain the seat by a solid 8% swing. Root of Conservative success: Adaptability combined with an understanding that Britain's electoral meta is currently a public that is left-wing economically and small-c conservative on cultural issues: The key to understanding this the Conservatives shift pragmatically on policy spectrum as needed and sit astride Britain's current electoral meta with the British public (for FPTP at least) is a majority who are left-wing economically, but small-c conservative on cultural issues. Labour's issue is thus not the one currently being battled about between the parties right and left (i.e. the party needs to go full-Blairite vs back to Corbyn who held Hartlepool- it's important to note here Hartlepool was held under Corbyn due to the Brexit Party splitting the vote- that Brexit Party vote yesterday all went not to Labour, but to the Conservatives , while this may be due to Keir Starmer's former position on Brexit, and the Labour candidate being a former remain supporter , it's unlikely that such a universal swing away from Labour was made on just that issue alone). Both of these sides are mired in the small detail and not seeing the bigger picture and real problem. The issue for Labour is as noted- that modern Britain has an electorate that generally is left-wing on economic issues, and small-c conservative on cultural ones. This was something recognized by Theresa May, and you saw some polling shift in Labour heartlands both around Brexit, but also May's concentration on economic policy frameworks for "Just about Managing" voters. Boris Johnson's leadership took this further, adopting policies that have the Thatcherite wing of the Conservatives very uncomfortable (Large scale state spending on infrastructure, tax hikes, increase in state intervention and spending in the economy, government centered research etc). His concentration on 'leveling up' the north is divisive internally (and among Conservative activists in the South East) but highlights a Conservative party that is doing what its always done- changing to meet the times in sometimes paradoxical and contradictory ways- Disraeli's conservatives were anti-liberal Sailsbury's were liberal and anti-socialist Macmillan's embraced socialist statism Thatcher revamped classical liberalism to roll back the state Johnson's One Nation economically left politics is a complete u-turn on Thatcher The Conservatives were able to shift with the electoral center-ground, and from there shape it once in power. Because of this the Conservatives are one of the most successful political parties in the world. Of the last 120 years, Labour has only been in power for 30 of them. This is because the Conservatives are ruthless in adapting to a changing electorate and completely flexible in policy platform, often quickly adopting a stance that was completely at odds with their former position (remember when they dubbed Ed Milliband's policies as communist, before promptly adopting them a few years later, and Corbyn's shift towards further left-wing economic platforms has allowed May and now Johnson to follow left in his wake). Britain's current electoral 'meta' under FPTP of left-wing economic and culturally small-c conservative voters dominating the ability to win seats has been recognized and leapt upon by the Conservatives. The difficulties for Labour (-primarily the Conservatives currently sit astride the new center ground of British politics): This will make any Labour gain or path forward incredibly difficult. The Conservatives are occupying their former stomping ground and are quite prepared to spend in a way totally at odds with Cameron's previous austerity framework- a Labour party that goes further left (return to Corbyn) risk being seen and tarred as "too radical", while the Conservatives can "play it safe" following in their wake, as indeed Johnson has done, promising economic policies that satisfy the electorates economic appetite. A Blairite Labour however would be at risk of the Conservatives actually offering more radical left-wing policies than they, while also keeping well away officially from US style "culture wars" that don't go down well, however well intended, with the electoral groups needed to win seats at Westminster- an aspect where Labour under Corbynite or Blairite control would struggle to remain distant from. Crafting policy for Labour is going to be incredible difficult going forward so long as the Conservatives continue to sit astride this economic-left, culturally-small c meta. This is exacerbated of course by the fact that historically Labour are held to a far higher standard of scrutiny than the Conservatives- to win Labour have to highlight in detail how policies they offer will work, be paid for and have a far higher degree of professionalism in their conduct (allegations of sleaze for instance, until they build to critical levels tend to not really effect Conservative MP's and their vote shares in the same way as they do to Labour). But some things that could improve things for Labour- A ) PR would change things- unlikely to ever happen in the UK B ) Conservatives fail to deliver upon their left-wing economic platform of "leveling up"- however this doesn't mean voters would go back to Labour and also it means agency is entirely in the government's remit, and results will be judged just as much on perception as on actual reality. C ) The Conservatives ditch Boris Johnson and shift back to a more Cameron or Thatcherite platform that gives space for Labour to flourish in the economic field. This could happen given there is a lot of disquiet on the backbenches and among the core Conservative vote about the direction of the party (Activists have accused Johnson of being a communist). However, it's very unlikely as long as Johnson keeps winning- the Conservatives are infamous pragmatists above all. D ) Labour creates a viable and large-scale modernizing policy platform that primarily emphasizes the economic aspects of change. Labour win they build "visions for the future" that envisage the raising of standards of living. Labour should not pitch a platform that is based or emphasizes their stance (and indeed divides) on cultural issues- unlike the US, there is more to be lost electorally than gained in terms of voters. Once in power Labour can address this as it sees fit.

Abstract : This article explores through a comparative perspective with its contemporary rivals the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and its success and innovation as an imperial model. The VOC is responsible for trail-blazing many of the modern commercial practices we know today such as public stocks and bonds, but it was also in its time a new and innovative model of imperialism, based on efficiency and commerce rather than older conceptions that mixed gold alongside glory and god. It would inspire a string of larger and more successful imitators, the most famous of which was the British East India Company which overtook the VOC in the later 1640s. Prior to this the VOC dominated Europe-Asiatic trade having displaced Portugal and Spain in the eastern hemisphere as the most successful European imperial actor. Introduction: The Dutch indirectly ruled their eastern possessions through the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC), a private entity which built, facilitated, and administered Dutch expansion in the eastern hemisphere from its founding in 1602. The VOC shared similarities with contemporary empires like Portugal in methods of administration, but uniquely for the time emphasised long-term profits as its foremost aim, with its directors stating that ‘profitable trade… is the principal reason for and aim of this company’ (Hereen XVII, quoted in Steensgaard, 1982, p.17). This focus was due to the United Provinces uniquely having a large and influential merchant class at home, and its eastern-hemisphere expansion being coordinated and overseen by a business enterprise accountable to its investors aboard, rather than being an entity directly under state control. The VOC thus lacked the broader multi-purpose nature of other contemporary empires with aspects like geopolitical competition subsumed to the pursuit of profit maximization. Comparisons here will be mainly drawn primarily from Portugal’s Estado da India and Russia with limited references to other contemporary empires. Portugal due to its role as the VOC's most significant early rival in the eastern hemisphere and its similar contexts and challenges as a fellow small maritime state, will show how the VOC uniquely acted with profitability as its sole aim. Russia as a continuous empire will provide a contrast for the elements that the Dutch VOC lacked as they were unnecessary in a profit-driven enterprise. What the VOC? A unique success story and kick-starter for the 17th Century: The VOC was a truly unique and pathfinding organization. It was in technical terms a state chartered joint-stock company (Grell, 2008, p.218). In practice it operated as a privately owned sub-imperialist body organized as a sovereign power, but with the functions of a business partnership (Steensgaard, 1982, p.3). It was the first large-scale organization with such a form. Only in 1670 would their British equivalent in the ‘East India Company’ acquire similar powers (Niall Ferguson, 2003 p.20), in imitation of the VOC. Indeed, British expansion in the eastern hemisphere during the 17th century was heavily inspired by the Dutch VOC model. The scale of its economic success made abundantly clear when in 1622 its Governor-general Jan Pietersz Coen reported Dutch capital in Asia amounted to 2.9 million florins, while Portuguese-Spanish capital was only around half a million (Steensgaard, 1982, p.16). This disparity was due to the VOC’s globalist outlook as it uniquely sold directly to the most profitable places, not constraining itself to the exclusive periphery-core trading relationship used among all other contemporary empires (Steensgaard, 1982, p.3). For the VOC this meant it generated a larger reserve of capital than its rivals, which also uniquely in Europe was mostly reinvested, highlighting a ruthless streak of profiteering as the Netherlands did not, as others, directly reap the material benefits of empire, but rather put their returns to good use in expanding their operation. The VOC as an imperial actor: The VOC’s powers derived from its state given charter to maintain troops, negotiate with foreign powers, impose governors on its holdings, and wage war (Grell, 2008, p.218), these powers were effectively the Dutch state outsourcing its own role. The VOC could be construed as a state arm in-so-far as it provided aid to the United Provinces during its inter-state competition with rival European powers, much in the same way that Portugal’s Estado da India helped fulfil Portugal’s competitive and crusading ambitions through weakening the revenues of key Islamic powers such as the Mamelukes and Ottomans (Grell, 2008, p.201). However, the VOC was significantly different as a state-arm. Its Governor was not an extension of state as a Portuguese Estado da India viceroy was, but a merchant representing a private business, (Grell, 2008, p.218) held accountable to directors and investors (Hereen XVII). A fact highlighted with the VOC’s investors and director’s reminder to Governor-General Coen that the objective of profits over glory-seeking enterprises was to be strictly ‘obeyed’ (Hereen XVII, quoted in Steensgaard, 1982, p.17). In contrast Jan Van Linschoten, a Dutch merchant in the late-16th century, states a Portuguese viceroy had ‘absolute power’ bestowed directly from the Portuguese Monarch allowing them to act as they pleased without significant reference to others (Van Linshoten, 1964a, p. 1). While this is perhaps an exaggeration of a viceroys powers lending from Van Linschoten’s heavy critiquing of the Portuguese system (Van Linshoten, 1964a, p.1), possibly in favour of the limited powers given to VOC governors who also needed their council’s approval to act (Grell, 2008, p.218). It does though bear a significant degree of truth showcased by the Portuguese crown’s instructions that the viceroy be obeyed as if ‘[the King] had…commanded it’ (Grell, 2008, p.200). A fact made necessary due to the length of time orders and communications from the central state could take to reach the imperial periphery, typically a message and its response could take a full year (Chaudhuri, p.57-70). God, Gold or Glory? The VOC’s profit motive Portugal’s direct control through their viceroy meant that unlike the VOC’s clear profit driven enterprise, multiple ambitions and aims clashed within its apparatus. The Portuguese crown’s religious aim of marginalizing and weakening Islamic power in Europe and the Middle East through undermining their spice revenue monopoly (Grell, 2008, p.201) and the expansion of state income through tribute and maritime trade to off-set Portugal’s resource disadvantage compared to its Christian European rivals (Grell, 2008, p.194), conflicted with the Fidalgos (sons of Portuguese gentry- a lower nobility) who in their capacity as state officials with a culture of feudal militarism saw conflict, and the glory and prestige found within it, as the only path to success (Grell, 2008, p.195). They specifically sought out personal wealth and societal prestige through plunder (Van Linshoten, 1964a, p.2), which conflicted with the stable economic growth needed if Portugal was to grow its economic power in a sustainable way to compete with European rivals. This is perhaps the reason why a Portuguese merchant in 1626 identified that both king and nobles ‘thought more highly of soldiering than of …trade’ (Solis, quoted in Steensgaard, 1982, p.17) The cost of militarisation for goals other than the pursuit of economic profit detracted from potential crown revenues. Meanwhile while the VOC recognized that military action might be needed in the course of its form of imperial expansion, this was carefully budgeted within its expenses, and only needed to be engaged in if a power was aiming to harm its profitable trade, or prevent the expansion of its trade networks. This is highlighted most succinctly by the VOC dismantling a number of its military assets in Asia as soon as their need had passed (Grell, 2008, p.219). A sophisticated economic operator As in Russia, Portuguese merchants had very little influence over state policy. This is most ably shown in the direct crown control of the spice monopoly in Portugal which forced the sale of spice immediately and in bulk to Portuguese ports. The VOC however, with a society in which the merchant classes held political influence within the unique monarchical-republic of the United Provinces were able to operate with a greater degree of market sophistication as they withheld their spice stocks so as to not flood the market and thus consistently manipulated favourable profits far in excess of those Portugal and other contemporaries achieved (Steensgaard, 1982, p.3). The geopolitical weaponization of the profit drive The VOC aims in maximizing profits alternatively complimented the government of the United Provinces, particularly in the context of its competition with the Portuguese-Spanish crown-union. The VOC was set up originally indeed to circumvent an embargo on Dutch merchants buying spices in Lisbon due to the ongoing Eighty years War (1568-1648) by controlling eastern commodities at source, whilst stemming declining profits due to Dutch merchants competing against one another, as well as their foreign counterparts (Grell, 2008, p.217-18). This coincided with the United Provinces’ aim of striking back at their Portuguese and Spanish rivals in a way that they may engage on equal terms due to the strength of their maritime forces, and weaken Portugal-Spain’s vastly larger military machine (Steensgaard, 1982, p.5). As the Dutch Republic was uniquely dominated by merchants at the political level, many of whom held an interest in the Asian trade (Grell, 2008, p.214), the economic was married to the geopolitical. The VOC was tasked to muscle in on Portuguese and Spanish eastern trade networks and disrupting their shipping. It was to ruthlessly pursue profit, and so in the process aid the Dutch state by disrupting and diminishing the income its rivals in lucrative markets, and by boosting the revenue of the Dutch state and political elite, which could then be further spent on defence. This resulted in a specific understanding that the VOC’s market domination and thus profitability was central to both its own affairs, and those of the United Provinces. Commerce over politics That the Dutch did not remove the Portuguese entirely from the East Indies, as the Russians had overran their rival Novgorod in 1478, shows that state competition was not a main factor. This is despite the VOC’s ability to make money and disrupt trade being incredibly helpful to the United Provinces in this area. The VOC had the ability to wipe out Portugal’s Asian presence, holding as it did the largest stock of modern ships in Europe, their type of galleon being far faster, cheaper and more powerful than Portugal’s equivalents. Indeed Portugal continued to rely on old stocks of medieval carracks for much of its trade (Grell, 2008, p.199 and 215). This disparity is highlighted in Francesco Carletti’s 1602 account of the Dutch ‘ruining’ the Portuguese carrack he was on and plundering it with ease (Carletti, 1964d, p.1). There are three Dutch ships noted in the encounter perhaps showing their regional superiority, and the battle is portrayed as one sided in favour of the far more manoeuvrable Dutch galleons. While Carletti might be overly critical of the Portuguese carrack’s ability to cope military due to his resulting financial loss (Carletti, 1964b, p.2), the encounter regardless remains a Dutch victory. Despite these material military advantages, the VOC did not attempt to eliminate the Portuguese presence in Asia, unless the Portuguese were specifically disrupting trade, or sitting on a particularly lucrative position. It was simply not in the VOC’s interest who answered to its shareholders before any state considerations. This is highlighted in the VOC’s directors’ chastisement of Governor-General Coen that the VOC’s military costs need to be reduced (Grell, 2008, pp.218-19), despite the fact that war is raging at the time. This is unexpected to say the least if state competition and expansion were deemed at all important aims for the VOC, especially as it was actively involved in a global war with Portugal. Indeed, Russia who aimed to compete with rival western and southern states prioritized military budgeting specifically to dominate its vast territory and expanded partly as a means to secure further revenue to pay for this (Chant, 2008, p.246). Budget warfare Instead the Dutch used their superior fleet to hit Portuguese return shipping. Forty-five percent of which was sunk in 1600 (Grell, 2008, p.216), probably because like Carletti’s returning ship, they were laden with goods to be seized by their VOC counterparts. That this was the primary strategy employed by the VOC to contribute directly to the war effort- maritime commerce raiding, rather than pushing the Portuguese out of the region, or physically expelling their forts highlights how military action for the VOC is subsumed into simply being another means of making a profit. The Portuguese were thus squeezed out of the market, but not the eastern hemisphere, and the VOC received revenue from encouraging business-minded privateering. Dutch shipping superiority was also used to uniquely change and secure the eastern intercontinental trade lanes and largely displace the traditional routes (Grell, 2008, p.223) to favour the Dutch at the expense of their rivals. The journey was thus also rendered more efficient, being faster and more secure, indicating that profitability and decreasing risk was the key concern. By comparison Portugal’s Estado da India had relied in Asia on simply partaking in the existing regional trade systems and were satisfied by gaining an income primarily through customs duties and shipping passes enforced by a string of forts and bases built to command these traditional trade systems (Grell, 2008, p.207). By direct comparison Spain created a new American trade lane with their annual treasure fleet, but the driving force here was not profitability, however. The revenues, as with Russia’s drive for increased economic returns were used to pay for military enterprise in Flanders to prop up Habsburg power against the United Provinces and other rivals and act as collateral on loans to keep the monarchy solvent (Waites, 2008, p.150). The English raided Spanish shipping lanes though unlike the Dutch they did so individually for personal wealth of the privateer captains and as part of state rivalry (Williams, 2008a, p.1). They did not set up for this venture an organized business arm with sophisticated commercial practices as the Dutch had. Side Note: Shipping Changes: The VOC’s larger stock of modern ships allowed them to seize commercial and strategic superiority from Portugal. In doing so they came to dominate key regional trade lanes, shifting them through volume to a way that suited the VOC (routing much traffic through Batavia, which became the VOC-owned controller of European trade in South-East Asia). The VOC also discovered and utilized the Brouwer route- founded by VOC explorer Hendrik Brouwer. It was a straight crossing from the Cape and up towards Java, and by 1616 was compulsory for all VOC ships travelling to the region. The winds on the route allowed for greatly increased speed, and thus shipping efficiency, which translated into profits. Though it required a skilled captain to make use of due to the difficulties navigating it without an accurate way to determine longitude at the time. In this way it was far safer for VOC ships, who were less likely to fall victim to disruption or piracy from regional or European rivals, and the expected usage meant VOC captains were experienced enough to utilize it effectively. It would displace the traditional Monsoon route used by the Portuguese. (Parthesius, 2010, pp.1-59) Endemic economic short-termism vs the VOC’s long-term outlook All this goes to highlight the short-term economic natures of most empires in comparison with the VOC’s long-term outlook. Portugal relied on local trade from which it skimmed profits (Grell, 2008, p.195). Likewise, English privateers were reliant on continued Spanish economic activity and a state of war. Spain’s wholesale extraction of commodities actually collapsed Spanish commerce (Waites, 2008, p.151) showing the pre-eminence of the state interests in these cases over those of their merchants. Meanwhile the Dutch uniquely sought to create a stable controlled trading monopoly keeping commodities profitable, but not so high that rivals would be tempted to take the risk and try and muscle in on market share, in a serious way (Steensgaard, 1982, p.3) avoiding the circumstances which had made Portugal a target for them, and ensuring that as far as possible they could keep their own military spending and activity commensurately low, ensuring higher returns from their commercial activity and greater focus on economic expansion. To ensure this the VOC aimed to control trading commodities directly like the Spice Isles, which were seized and made a plantation colony (Szczepankski, 2016) giving them greater control over pricing and scarcity. Portugal in comparison had relied on local merchants and facilitators to sell the commodities to them in the region for re-export to Europe. The use and role of a physical presence in Asia The VOC did though borrow the idea of regional enclaves from Portugal as these were pragmatic and efficient bases of operation (and control). They were necessary as economically and militarily powerful and populous states surrounded the India Ocean in this era, such as the Mughals, Indian kingdoms, Khmer and China to name a few who were capable of successfully combatting the smaller European presence and utilized similar technology, or imported it in from Europe (Scammell, 1980, p.3). This was a situation vastly unlike Spain’s American or Russia’s Siberian experience where existing states and entities were far weaker than the new arrivals and lacked comparable technology. The Portuguese enclaves were placed strategically to control local shipping and extract tribute from the area (Grell, 2008, p.207). The cost of running this system, due to the large-scale military presence needed at each outpost, and the sheer amount of enclaves, led an English ambassador in the east to note in 1616 that it was Portugal’s ‘beggaring’ (Roe, quoted in Steensgaard, 1982, p.16) correlating with Solis’ previous comment that Portugal relegated commerce in favour of short-term state revenues and military presence. VOC enclaves to facilitate their trading lanes were placed to directly control commodities like at Banda with its spice (Szczepanski, 2016), rather than simply to project power over a nearby territory. As such while the Portuguese expanded their physical presence, the Dutch were more cost-efficient; their directors even suggested removing a number of enclaves to streamline the VOC’s presence due to their existence being unnecessary for profit (Grell, 2008, p.219). Something unheard of in other contemporary empires as state-led expansion was linked to state and personal glory, Portugal for instance held onto unprofitable regions, and fought to do so due to prestige. (Williams, 2008b, p.116) a factor the VOC downplayed in its own calculations. Social, cultural and settler integration The Portuguese enclaves also differed from the Dutch as argued by Malyn Newitt by being small-scale settlement colonies with large numbers of Portuguese men settling and creating a mixed ‘Luso-Asian’ colonial population. This is evidenced in Carletti’s account of the Portuguese enclave of Goa, where the most marriageable women are ‘born…of Portuguese fathers’ (Carletti, 1964c, p.2). By this it is clear that there has been wide scale and historic cultural integration between Portuguese and Indians, and also that Portuguese men are commonly during the writers’ time, seeking local women to marry and settle down with in the enclave. Carletti further notes that baptism is a common practice for all subjects, as is Portuguese fashion indicating the adoption of Portuguese culture and religion by Indians, creating a colonial population with ties to Portugal. The few Dutch who settled in Asia themselves married Luso-Asian women, thus not creating a similar loyal colonial population. These women and their families tended to keep their Portuguese culture and Catholicism (Grell, 2008, p.223). The ecological footprint of the VOC was thus comparatively small as they did not transpose their culture unlike Portugal. The Portuguese’s more widespread presence as settlers was helped by Portuguese service-men having to pay for their own passage home, an exorbitant prospect that could cost up to a full years wages for many (Van Linshoten, 1964b, p.1), resulting in the poorer sailors and officials settling in ‘miserie’ as Linschoten’s writes at the time (Van Linshoten, 1964b, p.1). Though Linschoten’s accounts negative focus contrasts with Carletti’s idyllic lifestyle for Portuguese settlers (Carletti, 1964c, p.2) perhaps because of bias or the discussion of different social classes. Regardless large numbers of Portuguese settled to create a large mixed colonial population. By contrast most Dutch officials returned home after service (Grell, 2008, p.223). This when combined with the fact that the VOC applied strict trading restrictions on any company officials who chose to remain in the eastern hemisphere after their contract was up implies a policy of discouragement for settlers. This is likely because of the VOCs business focus. The independent trading of these individuals could disrupt the VOC’s ability to control profits and would affect their market monopoly and share. In contrast to attract settlers Russia gave ‘financial aid’ to prospective colonists of its eastern expansion to help them create a sustainable living for themselves, and eventually contribute to the state (Veradsky, 1972, p.1). The Dutch enclaves are thus one-dimensional in comparison to other states’ multi-functional settlements, being just assets to secure and facilitate trade and profit, rather than as dynamic settlements were integration and sustainability of presence was deemed important goals. The treatment of indigenous peoples The VOC was similarly pragmatic with indigenous peoples. They were uninterested in influencing local culture, society, or religion. This ran counter to Portugal’s creation of an informal empire in Japan with the active conversion of ‘300,000’ (Carletti, 1964a, p.2) locals by their state-sponsored Jesuits (Grell, 2008, p.211) and Spain’s conquest-based campaigns to ‘civilize’ non-Christians evidenced by Bernal Diaz justifying his participation in the massacre at Cholula as saving indigenes from ‘a state of idolatry’ in the long-term (Diaz, 1963 [c.1570], p.11). The VOC meanwhile concentrated on trade and economic gain, not souls. Religion was a fundamental part of contemporary life; it was not merely a cynical legitimisation for exploitation. The Spanish encomienda were meant to facilitate the conversion of Amerindians as well as utilizing their labour for economic gain. They were specifically chartered with having responsibility for their workers religious welfare (Waites, 2008, p.133). This highlights the entwined nature of economics with religion for most empires, excepting the VOC and Russia. Instead Russia was careful to maintain stable revenues for the crown, even forbidding Russians to baptize indigenous peoples (Dmytryshyn, 1991, p.5) as once baptized, subjects could become enslaved and removed from directly paying tribute. Moreover, Russia incorporated indigene nobles into what M.I. Finley terms an imperial hierarchy regardless of their religion or culture (Chant, 2008, p.240). Spain also did this through the vassalage of indigenous rulers (Waites, 2008, p.141). The Dutch lacked an imperial hierarchy as its maintenance was costly. The VOC were more interested in allying with indigenous peoples against Portugal rather than adopting them into their own imperial system. This was not altruistic by any means but was meant to further diminish the Portuguese threat to VOC control of profitable commodities by making their presence difficult to maintain (Steensgaard, 1982, p.9). It also meant the VOC could spend less on military enterprise, relying instead on local support. Further, The VOC also participated in the slave trade, indigenous kingdoms and powers would sell them their sells and the VOC would ship these to plantation colonies in the eastern hemisphere or elsewhere, or on to other European traders. Conclusion The lack of primary source coverage over-time and in an equal matter handicaps the analysis somewhat in presenting a full range of differences that might be correlated with one another, especially as sources are an individual’s experience and not indicative alone to the larger picture. This makes comprehensive analysis of every aspect difficult. This article is thus not exhaustive, but highlights through key elements the VOC’s importance in shaping the eastern Dutch empire by uniquely subsuming all other typical imperial interests of contemporaries to the pursuit of stable profits due to its nature as a business enterprise, supported by an understanding merchant-led state. This mitigated the competing interests that watered down the aim of profit in other empires. The VOC’s pursuit of permanency of profits acted as a model for future sub-imperialist enterprise as states like Britain and France saw a cost-efficient model for expansion which guaranteed economic returns without directly shouldering the costs of empire. Bibliography: Primary Sources: Carletti, F. (1964a) First Chronicle of the East Indies. In Which is told the voyage from the Philippine Islands to those of Japan, and other notable things of that region, New York, Pantheon Books Carletti, F. (1964b) Third Chronicle of the East Indies. Which treats of the voyage made from the island of Macao in China to Malacca and thence to Goa, and of what occurred during that voyage, New York, Pantheon Books Carletti, F. (1964c) Fourth Chronicle of the East Indies, Dealing with the debarking and stay in the city of Goa, up to embarking for Lisbon, with all other particulars of the matters of India, New York, Pantheon Books Carletti, F. (1964d) Fifth Chronicle of the Second Oriental Account, Which deals with the departure from Goa en route for Lisbon and with what happened that voyage up to arrival in Zeeland, New York, Pantheon Books Diaz, B. (1963 [c.1570]) The Conquest of New Spain, Harmondsworth, Penguin Dmytryshyn, B. (1991) A petition on the Siberian fur trade from the merchant Guselnikov to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich protesting excessive regulation of the fur trade in Siberia, 1639, Fort Worth, Texas, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers Las Casas, B.D. (2004 [1552]) A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies, London, Penguin Tavernier, J.B. (1925) Travels in India, London, Oxford University Press Van Linshoten, J.H. 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Parthesius, R., (2010) Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters: The Development of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) Shipping Network in Asia 1595-1660, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Scammell, G.V., (1980) ‘Indigenous assistance in the establishment of Portuguese power in Asia in the sixteenth century’, Modern Asian Studies Vol.14 no.1 Steensgaard, N., (1982) ‘The Dutch East India Company as an institutional innovation’, Dutch Capitalism and World Capitalism, Cambridge University Press Waites, B. (2008) ‘The Beginning Of Atlantic Empires: Spain In The New World’, How do empires begin?. Milton Keynes, The Open University. Williams, C.A. (2008a) ‘Pirates, Pilgrims, Plantations and Pigs: The Beginnings Of The British Atlantic Empire 1497-1660’, How do empires begin? Milton Keynes, The Open University. Williams, C.A. (2008b) ‘Introduction’, How do empires begin?. Milton Keynes, The Open University. Online Sources: Szczepanski, K. (2016) ‘The Bandas Massacre’ in Nutmeg: The Unsavoury History Of A Tasty Spice [Online]. Available at: http://asianhistory.about.com/od/colonialisminasia/p/Nutmeg-Unsavory-History.htm (Accessed 19th December 2017)

A US carrier group on Sunday crossed into the disputed South China Sea to carry out ‘Freedom of navigation’ operations and reassure regional partners of the US’ continuing support for their struggle with China over island and maritime claims , the ownership of which would bestow significant influence and control over a region which facilitates 1/3rd of all global shipping . China has decried the move as “ not conducive to peace and stability in the region ”. However, at the same time in its own provocative move the Chinese air force carried out a large-scale incursion of Taiwanese airspace using fighters and nuclear-capable bombers for the first time . No comment has yet been made by Beijing as to the specific reason for this escalation, though undoubtedly it was linked to the imminent arrival of the US Carrier Group and more broadly is just the latest escalation in a historic dispute over both competing South China Sea claims , and the very nature of Taiwanese sovereignty, with both Beijing and Taipei both claiming to be the legitimate Chinese government after the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949) saw the split of China into the two self-governing entities. Taiwan as a key US partner, particularly due to its strategic location and area-of-denial capability has received a “ rock-solid ” US commitment to support its dispute, as Biden continues Trumps policy of increasing cooperation with Taipei . An important point since Taiwan is not officially recognized by the US, or indeed most states around the world, due to the success of Beijing's ' One China ' policy making such a feat incredibly difficult without dramatically increasing tensions, and so diplomatic relations and material aid to Taiwan has always been a fraught affair, despite its importance to US regional strategy. Similarly, the Biden administration has also reaffirmed its commitment to other key regional partners like Japan as it continues to try and create an anti-Beijing alliance, and a military buffer where the South China Sea issue is concerned at least. This is made all the more difficult though as several key and prospective US partners also dispute certain elements of the South China Sea among themselves , as well as Beijing, making stable cooperation fragile and difficult, though China's far more aggressive and widespread moves somewhat alleviate this as Beijing paints itself as the key disruptive element for regional powers. Biden has also sent a signal of his willingness to continue US confrontation with Beijing by his appointment of several Cabinet members who have made “ aggressive ” public comments against Beijing, both on its South China Strategy, its wider global aims and the perceived hostile economic policies from which China benefits as the expense of domestic industries elsewhere (Janet Yellen's comments on currency manipulation for instance). These points combined with the longer-term commitment later this year for the US and Royal Navy to carry out further South China Sea operations means that any hoped for ‘ great reset ’ in US-China relations is now highly unlikely as Biden continues the previous administrations policy of confrontation with Beijing over economic and security matters. The South China Sea thus will remain the primary, though not exclusive , arena of this growing great power competition.

Above image of states which have signed cooperation agreements related to the Belt and Road Initiative ( Wikimedia Commons ) China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is beginning to gather steam once more after its Covid-19 forced slow down , as China’s Foreign Minister visited five key African partners to explore further investment. However, there can be detected a shift towards a more cautious policy for BRI expansion, informed by the economic fallout of Coronavirus, which hit the global and Chinese economy hard. Though in China’s case the true impact of Covid-19 might be more psychological than material, as while economically it has sprung back quickly and is now growing at a faster rate than prior to the pandemic , Covid-19 also represented the first time the Chinese economy has contracted since the 1970s when Mao-era collectivization was abolished. This psychological shock, for a state whose legitimacy rests on providing ever-increasing economic growth and so raising the living standards for its citizens in return for them accepting its authoritarian model of governance , and combined with the economic weakness of BRI partners has seemingly awakened a more fiscally cautious streak in Beijing as it becomes more concerned about securing a reasonable and stable return on its large-scale investments in partners, to compliment the expected geopolitical gains, rather than the latter dominating the agenda . The evidence for this switch is most apparent in Pakistan this week, which has long been the most important element of the BRI for Beijing. Dubbed the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), geopolitically it gives Beijing secure and direct access to the Persian Gulf , limits the ‘safe spaces’ for Uighur militants who utilize Northern Pakistan as a safe harbor, and also more broadly surrounds and isolates China’s regional rival, India, and specifically pressures its contestation of the Kashmir region . These geopolitical and security reasons are why China as of 2020 has invested $60 billion in Pakistan , the largest of any BRI partners , and why China currently is the biggest lender to Pakistan owning 1/5 of Pakistan’s total debt and rising. This has caused some experts to argue that Pakistan is fast becoming a victim of Beijing’s neo-colonial debt-trap diplomacy . With Pakistan potentially soon unable to pay back Beijing and instead being forced to give up assets or political control, as happened in Sri Lanka when China directly seized Hambantota Port for 99 years as Sri Lanka fell behind on its debt repayments. However, in contradiction to this, it is Pakistan’s debt levels that are causing it a rift with China over CPEC. Pakistan is demanding further Chinese loans at concessionary rates , while China is reluctant due to Pakistan’s uncertain ability to pay these back , and its political instability delaying stable repayment , even going so far as to for the first time ever delay the gathering of the China-Pakistan Joint Cooperation Committee which oversees and makes decisions regarding CPEC until terms more favourable to China can be reached. This firmer stance is new in an area that is of such vital importance to China geopolitically, and certainly sign-posts a more economically focused BRI that wants a monetary return for its investment beyond political influence (or an arguable pseudo-colony ). Whether this change has an impact on the sheer scope or expected overruns of BRI remains to be seen.

NASA has announced that it is going to pay private companies for Moon rocks between 50g and 500g and other objects of 'scientific value'. This is not however, an economic venture, the amount paid is paltry to the costs of collection, with one company getting as little as $1 as NASA are not paying for the development or transport costs, but simply the rocks themselves . The creation of a business model for outer-space exploitation: The fact though that money is exchanging hands at all is significant, as for both NASA and the four private enterprises commissioned; Lunar Outpost (USA), ispace Japan, ispace Europe, and Masten Space Systems (USA) it seeks to create a recognized and viable system of the commercial extraction, sale and use of outer-space resources by implementing a buyers and sellers market for space materials. The payment method for instance is structured so that ' companies will receive 10% of their total proposed price upon award, will receive 10% upon launch, and the remaining 80% upon successful completion '. This is clearly ridiculous for as small a sum as a mere $1, but its an attempt to set a precedent for future, more lucrative, transactions. The private enterprises meanwhile are getting valuable experience and practice at extracting outer-space resources. This is important, because Space mining would take the economy of the earth onto a radically different footing through how incredibly lucrative, and necessary it is. Lucrative in terms of asteroids existing like '16 Psyche' , situated in the belt between Mars and Jupiter, whose metal content is valued at $10,000 quadrillion, compared to the entire global economy which in 2021 is expected to reach $149 trillion . Incidentally this is an asteroid that NASA is planning to visit in 2016. While its debated that such a shock to the earths global economy at the addition of such an asteroid could be negative , most analysts agree that the profits will actually be vast and the earths economy well able to adapt to make it a lucrative enterprise. It is necessary in terms of the earths finite resources. For instance, rare earth materials like platinum are integral for 'green technologies', but its questionable if there is enough supply currently to keep up with its growing demand. Space though represents a vastly greater source of platinum that could be exploited to help aid the path towards sustainability on earth. This is not to mention the fact that shifting the mining emphasis to Space will mean far less contamination and pollution on Earth, with mining being a key contributor to environmental degradation . The mining of resources in space is also big business in how it can help aid further space exploration . Having water, minerals and other resources available in space drastically reduces the cost of space exploration and increases its reach as there will be less reliance on costly supply rockets from Earth . The creation of a concept of outer-space ownership: More though than the implementation of a business model, there is the aim to create a recognized system of ownership for Space resources. NASA particular notes that; ' Companies will collect a small amount of lunar regolith from any location on the Moon and provide imagery to NASA of the collection and the collected material, along with data that identifies the collection location. Subsequent to receiving such imagery and data, an “in-place” transfer of ownership of the lunar regolith to NASA will take place. After ownership transfer, the collected material becomes the sole property of NASA for the agency’s use under the Artemis program. ' This has important implications, firstly NASA are at great pains to note that the collected material after transfer will become the 'sole property' of NASA. I.e. space resources once extracted can be owned by an agency, state or private body and thus utilized in any way deemed fit, in this case for use in NASA's project to put a man and woman on the Moon by 2024. Further though there is an implicit note here that the companies extracting these from the Moon have ownership of whatever they have extracted, at the point of extraction (the mining site), as they may then 'transfer' the ownership of these 'in-place' to NASA once certain conditions are met. This is an attempt to solidify the 2015 US Commercial Space Act formulated and passed by the Obama administration, part of which set out to enable; ' A U.S. citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an asteroid resource or a space resource shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell it according to applicable law, including U.S. international obligations. ' The Act proved controversial, with European specialists in Space law arguing it contravened the UN Outer Space Treaty 1967 , whose Article II forbade the ' national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means '. The Obama administration was clearly though aware of the potential controversy as they actively noted in the Act that ' it is the sense of Congress that the United States does not, by enactment of this Act, assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or ownership of, any celestial body '. The concept here then is based on the idea that extraction of resources equates to ownership of the extracted resource at point of extraction, but just like economic activities in international waters , this does not mean that the territory occupied to perform the extraction means that someone is making a claim to 'own' that area in a dejure legal sense, it instead remains a 'global commons'. This is exactly the case the US argues too, as Article I of the Outer Space Treaty essentially makes Space a global commons by stating; ' Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies .' On top of forbidding the making of claims of sovereignty. Thus, the US concentrates merely on the ownership of extracted resources, as is the precedent on earth for the economic exploitation of global commons. The legal experts who disagree of course, argue that there is an implicit violation by one company or state taking ownership of things they've 'picked up' from Space. Regardless though, the US system here opens up two routes that Space exploitation can be facilitated by, despite the Outer Space Treaty: 1) Court of law overrules the Outer Space Treaty: Firstly, the US system of 'ownership of extraction' is tested in a legal court, as a private company seeks to take ownership over an actual territory they are mining so as to prevent rival competitors from simply building a mine nearby and tapping into their vein too, or indeed an off-earth mine being set up near a research station which could have incredibly disruptive consequences for the non-mining party (an issue that happened historically in Britain for instance, where mines attempted to take ownership of local water supplies and disrupted other forms of human activity which could only be settled in court through a judgement for ownership to one party or the other). These are issues resolved by a territorial claim then, which the Outer Space Treaty of course prevents (though there are some critics who argue it does not apply to private enterprise , realistically it does as states who are bound by the treaty are made responsible for the actions of their private enterprises, so there is an implicit expectation, though again this may need testing in a court). A court ruling for a private company to have ownership of the area it is mining (or indeed a court ruling that those disrupted by the mining have rights, and thus implicit ownership of the area they inhabit), will essentially contradict and likely nullify the Outer Space Treaty. It after all was purposefully vague and loose as space exploration was in its infancy when it was created and so needed to be kept adaptable and changeable. 2) Skirting around the Outer Space Treaty Secondly though, it might be that Space exploitation is facilitated simply by continuing to skirt the Outer Space Treaty and using its vagueness as a continuing cover with states happy to allow the use of loop holes and so not see the treaty as a set of overriding aims, undermined. This is where the similarities to the exploitation of resources in 'international waters' are maintained and concentration surrounding ownership is given at the point when something is 'picked up' or extracted. Antarctic imperialism as a laboratory for Space imperialism: This isn't a new concept by any means, beyond the example of exploitation of 'international waters' it bears a lot of similarities with the current Antarctic Treaty System which facilitates an internationally governed Antarctica, as epitomized by the 1961 Antarctic Treaty ( which the Outer Space Treaty incidentally owes a lot to ). The Antarctic was, and is, probably one of the last frontiers, bar the Arctic Ocean, of territorial grabs and imperialism. Like Space, the Antarctic has no indigenous population (the exploration of rights of potential alien civilizations is beyond the scope of this article- though a debate does exist ) and so is a platform of 'pure' inter-state competition where claims were made to the continent based on a number of competing conceptions of what constituted a valid claim of ownership in a region that was, like Space, an incredibly hostile environment which prevented the easy facilitating of traditional legal conceptions such as ' Effective Occupation ' (i.e. the provision and enforcement of a largely non-contested administrative regime and legal system to a territory) as a valid claim to ownership. Instead the occupation had to be creatively shown in Britain and Argentina's (two of the key Antarctic rivals) view by Effective 'use' of a territory scientifically (through the quality and quantity of research produced on an area; The National Archives, London, FO 371/113971, Foreign Office Cabinet Paper on Antarctica 26 January 1955). Though Britain also recognized it; Economically (through the control of whaling licenses; The National Archives, London, CAB 129/40/39, Proposal to Re-Establish a Whaling Base on Deception Island, 26 June 1950 ) And through; Environmental authority (through acceptance of their stewardship and regulation surrounding regional environmental sustainability; ( Adrian Howkins, ‘Frozen Empires: A History of the Antarctic Sovereignty Dispute Between Britain, Argentina and Chile, 1939-1959’ (The University of Texas at Austin, D.Phil Dissertation, 2008), 12-13 ). These latter two were not categories accepted by Argentina. The United States likewise had a very different conception of 'scientific use', and counted air surveillance as a valid means of claiming territory through discovery, which was not shared by the other claimant powers (Steve Heavens, 'Brian Roberts and the origins of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, 52, Polar Record (2016), 719). In all cases though 'physical presence' (be it from a scientific research team, summer base, permanent administrative official or whalers operating under a national license) came to be the basis of 'Effective Occupation', instead of a comprehensive administering system, and thus the basis for a claim, to the extent that science was being utilized politically, for instance Britain judged its scientific activity not on its own merits, but increased it to ensure it did not lag behind the activity (and so presence) of Argentina and the USA (The National Archives, London, FCO 7/3248, Memo by Hankey on United Kingdom Policy in the Antarctic area, 8 November 1957 ). Equality of opportunity equates to solidifying ownership- Antarctic and US administrative models: The other most obvious way of course that the current US model of Space ownership facilitation shares a big debt to the development of the Antarctic and its geopolitical claims is through the fact that it opened the competition for contracts to both US and non-US companies, with apparently 22 of the private enterprises participating in the bidding process being foreign owned, and of course half of those accepted being based in Japan and Luxembourg. This not only is testament to the USA's market orientated approach, even in the Trump era of 'America First', but also (and perhaps mainly) due to the fact that the co-opting of foreign enterprise into your judicial and administrative framework is a major, and key, way of increasing the legitimacy of any ownership system. It strengthens the claims by having a diverse number of companies invested in maintaining and expanding the model (who may also pressure their own governments to accept it), but also is a key recognition of authority and so ownership of extraction, or indeed defacto territory itself, as this article is arguing. The Antarctic highlights this succinctly with Britain's drive to regulate economic activity in the region. Antarctic whaling being key, which was primarily done not by British companies, but by Norwegian (British Library, London, IOR/L/PS/12/1292, Copy of a telegram from Foreign Office to Buenos Aires, no.810, 21 December 1947) and indeed enterprises from Britain's rival claimant in the region, Argentina (The National Archives, London, ADM1/25082, Letter to Oliver Lyttalton, 11 February 1953). That companies from these states accepted British administrative authority, bid for British licenses and accepted British regulations of their activities in the region was a key part of Britain's 1955 unilateral International Court of Justice (ICJ) case to have Argentina and Chile recognize their claims. The case of course was unsuccessful not because it was ruled against, but because Argentina and Chile refused to participate citing the Antarctic as a domestic matter, rather than an international one, and thus denying the ICJ's jurisdiction (The National Archives, London, Telegram from British Embassy Santiago to Hankey (American department, FO), Restricted (1521/19/67) memo, 5 February 1957). Antarctic competition and Space competition- National interests trump hopeful thinking: The 1961 Antarctic Treaty supposedly put an end to the increasing competition. It was the Cold War's first 'arms control' treaty and it came about after war nearly broke out several times over the Antarctic, particularly between Argentina and Britain who in the period 1943-1954 were involved in a number of operations and heated clashes with one another, including one live-fire incident at Hope Bay in 1952 when a British scientific party were shot at by Argentine soldiers (The National Archives, London, ADM1/ 23580, Telegram from Falkland Islands Governor, 1 February 1952), as well as the coming of Russia to the continent during the International Geophysical Year 1957-8 which threatened to bring significant Cold War tensions to an already delicate region (The National Archives, London, FO 371/126126 , Telegram to Hankey, from Murihead at Washington Embassy, 11 May 1957). The Antarctic Treaty stipulated that all claims would essentially be 'frozen' (i.e. ignored, though not discarded or resolved) as its Article IV stated; ' Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as: a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-recognition of any other State‚s rights of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. ' This combined with the ironically far more stringent demilitarization requirements in the Antarctic Treaty than the Outer Space Treaty stipulates, the former demanding in Article I that the continent is to be used for 'peaceful purposes' only with no military weapons or activity allowed in the region, while the latter's Article IV only prevents military activity on celestial bodies, and weapons of mass destruction from being deployed in Space (but not military activity or normal weapons in Space), means that the Antarctic is effectively a 'global commons' for scientific research and exploration (though the extent it allows the whole world to participate, or is merely gate-keeping for the Antarctic Treaty powers is debatable ), the very thing that the Outer Space Treaty would attempt to mimic for Space. However, even the Antarctic's far more stringent governance system did not end competition between states over claims. While legally claims were frozen, and it was stipulated that; ' No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force .' In practice this has done little to change the nature of states perspectives. For instance, in 1984 Britain was still concerned about preserving it's Antarctic presence to sustain it's claims against Argentina and Chile, despite the latter two being fellow signatories to the Antarctic Treaty and the above article being in force, stepped up funding for the British Antarctic Survey so it's physical presence and activity would not be deemed to have diminished (Klaus Dodds, Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire, (London, 2002), 192). Indeed in 2012 one of the arguments utilized successfully to prevent the British Antarctic Survey being merged with the National Oceanography Center was that the Survey had a political dimension to protecting British claims in the Antarctic . Indeed nearly all claimant nations of Antarctic territory, seem to have rejected the Antarctic Treaty's aim to increasing international cooperation, as epitomized by Article III encouraging a shared scientific enterprise, that would more efficiently pool costs and increase the production of knowledge in a risk-filled and harsh environment, and have instead stuck to national-based activities based in their respectively claimed areas , despite in other areas, such as the International Space Station, being quite willing to pool their resources with one another. The reason of course is that the activity aids their claims, which at some point might be reactivated if the Antarctic treaty is changed or rejected, and that this all still has a significant political emphasis even while supposedly 'frozen', to the extent that states are shunning economizing and making their Antarctic efforts more rationale, and instead favoring the protection of their individual claims, at greater cost and risk to themselves. Indeed Shirley Scott has gone so far as to single out that the Antarctic Treaty in fact benefited the US from an imperialistic perspective , as it allowed the US unhindered access to the entire continent to be able to build bases wherever it liked and so while in legal terms, the Article about no activities taking place while the Antarctic Treaty is in force may constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty holds, in reality- an increased US presence (Or indeed as of late a rapidly expanding Chinese presence ), means that if the Antarctic Treaty is ever dropped, the US (or China) will have a large-scale presence that would render the basis of other Antarctic powers claims, moot as they would no longer be able to administer their territories effectively, especially if the US presence outnumbers there own. To build on Scott's idea here then, in a defacto sense, the US, China, Britain, Argentina and the other claimants claims over the area still exist as pressing political concerns, despite claims being taken off the table in a legalistic dejure sense. This is to the extent that these powers are no cooperating on the scale hoped for, and instead concentrating their Antarctic resources in a way that will maximize their pre-existing claims (or allow the making of new claims) the minute the Antarctic Treaty ceases to be upheld, or is changed. If that happens, then the defacto can easily become the dejure through a legal, political or diplomatic challenge by the competing states. Specific lessons regarding claims from the Antarctic Treaty for the Outer Space Treaty- defacto trumps dejure: The difference then between a legalistic dejure interpretation of claims and ownership, and the defacto situation in terms of physical presence, competing conceptions of what constitutes a claim and that simply national governments continue to pursue, right up until today their own interests in areas they deem appropriate, despite signing international treaties to the contrary (and indeed the very international treaty that inspired the Outer Space Treaty) means that skirting the Outer Space Treaty, creating a defacto ownership of territory on a celestial body through physical occupation or use, that for instance a mining company would entail, would be far far easier than many current space legal experts are highlighting. Indeed it would then from that point be fairly easy at a later date of the state or private companies choosing to then revert back to Route 1, in which they present their physical occupation and usage of a territory in a courtroom, highlight the necessity of protecting their enterprise from competitors (on a political or simply health and safety ground) and use their existing comparatively overwhelming presence in the area they wish to claim as a fait accompli to be rubber stamped and so become legal (and thus override the Outer Space Treaty stipulation). This is not even though simply a lesson which applies to the US attempts at skirting the Outer Space Treaty in a way which essentially equates to defacto ownership. Russia openly intends to create a Moon base for helium mining , despite committing itself to honoring the Outer Space Treaty and condemning current US actions surrounding its opening up of space to mining claims on a national basis . Likewise, China intends to among other initiatives, 'capture' asteroids and bring them back to earth for its industry to mine. This arguably implies an outright breaking of the Outer Space Treaty, rather than a simple skirting and the US is attempting, as it means laying claim and ownership to an entire celestial body, and then to move it, which certainly breaks Article II and potentially Article IX on not taking actions which may harmfully contaminate the Earth. India is another Space mining actor, who seeks to exploit Luna and asteroid resources, and whose Chairman of the Indian Space Research Organization (India's national space agency) has openly stated that he wants ' the countries which have the capacity to bring that source from the moon to Earth will dictate the process '. This means that it should be up to the countries involved in facilitating the exploitation of space, who should be the ones to make and shape the rules and laws surrounding it, which includes ownership. A clear knock to the legitimacy of the Outer Space Treaty as providing the rules for the process. The wider Antarctic comparison- avoid the pitfalls of the past, the need for a realist-driven reform to the Outer Space Treaty: There is then a very similar political situation developing regarding the exploitation of Space, as to Antarctic claims, despite both having a treaty framework which aimed to prevent an imperialistically driven land-grab, where ownership claims were made in a scramble that could result in at best states being left out of the race altogether, and at worst see political tensions develop on earth over the ownership and exploitation of territories, they are both also subject to the major players seeing these treaties, perhaps inevitably as merely a framework to be noted (or ignored) and not wholly applying to them. Just as in the Antarctic claims still loom large in the minds of governments, to the extent that scientific activity is directed with a political eye to maintaining (or increasing) the legitimacy of their claims, in Space defacto ownership is implied in all these mining operations in the way the states plan to initiative them. While this contradicts the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty, much like the Antarctic Treaty, governments are acting in their own interests, under the assumption that treaties do not last forever. The Antarctic Treaty for instance is up for modification or scrapping in 2048 . Given that climate change has made the commercial exploration and exploitation of the continent increasingly viable as rising temperatures melt the ice, potentially revealing a treasure trove of resources like oil deposits and rare earth materials to exploit, and as states like China are arguably already trying to positioning themselves to take advantage of if not the scrapping of the Antarctic Treaty, at least changes allowing for economic exploitation , which claimant states like Britain historically viewed as being the end of the Antarctic Treaty as a serious and enforceable document due to the increased competition itn would mean (Klaus Dodds, Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire, (London, 2002), 190). In this context its understandable why current Antarctic powers have essentially continued to try and build-up their claims and positions in the region, despite the Antarctic Treaty 'freezing' claims. The same goes for Space, a purposefully vague and old treaty does not provide sufficient cover and certainty for states to feel they can be 'left behind' by their earthly competitors and miss out on exploiting the stars. There is no reason to let their guard down and not seek ways to under the cover of the treaty, skirting it, or ignoring it, build up a physical case for their defacto ownership of celestial bodies. Even a more comprehensive treaty would struggle to contain their national interests from dominating (as the Antarctic Treaty failed to create truly international cooperation in the region in a way that would see states placing the maintenance of their claims as a secondary objective). The fact that every major power is set on somehow circumventing or ignoring the Outer Space Treaty to pursue the exploitation of Space bodes ill for its future sustainability as a binding document, beyond providing of course an important anchor document for a framework that seeks to ease (though does not prevent) the militarization of Space, in a similar way that the Anglo-Argentine-Chilean Tripartite Naval Declaration prevented Antarctic tensions from going too far by limiting the military assets in the region (The National Archives, London, FO 371/113976, 'Memo by Speaight', 1 November 1955 ), and much like the Outer Space Treaty did not totally prevent military displays of force being used to solidify claims of sovereignty such as during the 1953 Deception Island incident , where British Royal Marines and a Frigate supported the arrest of Argentine military personnel who they deemed had illegally occupied Deception Island (which was claimed by both Britain and Argentina), prior to the ban on military assets that is perhaps the most tangible of the Antarctic Treaty's achievements. A treaty governing Space must take into account a realistic appraisal of states national interests in exploitation to be effective: Whatever happens from here, any future Space framework must account for the tangible interests of nation states among the stars and allow their peaceable facilitation rather than blocking them and forcing workarounds. If this can be achieved in it may prevent a 'scramble' that might increase tensions on earth, and cut off Space exploration and exploitation for latecomers. It will avoid the mistakes of the Antarctic Treaty, where an idealistic interpretation of a peaceful continent with 'frozen' claims resulted in little tangible progress regarding the easing of political tensions over claims, and has instead resulted in a slow build-up in presence of all concerned states, and the potential for the complete scrapping of the treaty in 2048. Instead a realistic re-envisioning of Space ownership and the Outer Space Treaty now could avoid a multitude of tensions and complaints and mean that states like the US do not have to currently experiment unilaterally with their own controversial models of ownership, which they justify in part by a refusal of Russia and China to engage with them to ratify a singular system, due to the cover the Outer Space Treaty provides (despite all powers flaunting it). In Part 2: Part 2 will continue the Applied History emphasis of this article, by looking at a similar model of historic imperialism to the one the US seems to be implementing from NASA's announcement, and what lessons we can subsequently learn about what to expect in terms of Space power and exploitation.

1) Arctic sea ice at record low October levels: Water temperatures north of Siberia were 2 to 4 degrees warmer than normal. On October 28 the Danish Meteorological Institute has warned that sea ice in the Arctic was at record lows for October and its rate of regrowth slower than normal. Scientists at the institute highlighted that this followed a consistent downward trend for October ice of 8.2 percent over the last 10 years. The institute dubbed this trend a ‘vicious spiral’ as with ever less ice reflecting the sunlight, oceans become ever warmer, which results in further ice loss. Because of this the Arctic has been warming twice as fast as the rest of the world in a process dubbed ‘Arctic amplification’. It is feared that the loss of Arctic sea ice may raise temperatures globally by 0.2C according to the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. This is on top of the current 1.5C that human activity has rendered inevitable and that the 2016 Paris agreement desired to keep below. This of course a speeding of the process which has seen the British Antarctic Survey already bring the date for an 'ice-free' Arctic forward to 2035. There are significant risks to this, not least of all the impact of rising water levels and changing levels of sea salt, but also opportunities as the scramble for resources and Arctic shipping lanes begins- which of course comes with its own geopolitical consequences as we're beginning to see play out with Russia and China potentially seeking to 'dominate' the high north , met by NATO and specifically Canada, US, Denmark and the UK who are all pursuing their own interests. The Arctic sea ice as of 19 November is only now just starting to form. 2) U.S. and Greenland close to finalizing economic and security agreement: The agreement is aimed at curtailing China’s growing Arctic influence As of October 29, the Trump administration are finalizing a deal aimed at strengthening ties with Greenland and minimizing China’s Arctic ambitions. The talks have produced several agreements on security, diplomatic cooperating and trade. These both ensure US security due to Greenland’s geostrategic importance to it, while also providing as Marc Jacobsen from the Scott Polar Research Institute states ‘tangible benefits’ for Greenlanders, including guaranteed jobs at the US base at Thule, and greater US investment in mining and tourism. The geopolitical context for this agreement harks back to China’s 2018 interest in taking Greenland up on its offer to build new commercial airports. China proposed it would fund three new airports, but the Pentagon derailed the deal due to U.S. security concerns, primarily Greenland’s proximity to the US as well as its Thule airbase, which houses an element of the USA’s missile early-warning system. 3) Russian development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) gathers apace: Russia to build a fleet of ice-breaking LNG vessels for NSR shipping Back in January 2020 the Russia government announced that as part of its effort to make the Arctic commercially viable, it would undertake a major infrastructure development on the Arctic’s Northern Sea Route. The route hugs the coast of Siberia and allows shipping to Asia in only 15 days via the Bering Strait, half the time of the traditional Suez route. Indeed, in May this year Sovcomflot ice-class Arc7 LNG Christophe de Margerie completed an eastbound passage on the NSR to China, in challenging ice conditions, in only 12 days . A key part of Russia’s NSR development is the report on 30 October that Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed an executive order that among other things requires the Russian backed shipping company Sovcomflot ordered three new Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) carriers of ice-class tonnage. The ships will be integral to the success of several Russian projects seeking to exploit Arctic natural gas, such as Arctic LNG 2, which is estimated to cost $21.3 billion US dollars, by carrying the gas to customers in Asia, particularly China. With this latest order Sovcomflot’s fleet of LNG carriers will grow to 34 vessels in total, 19 of which are under construction. 4) Scientists find large Arctic methane deposits are beginning to release It is feared evidence of new methane leaks may increase likelihood of abrupt global warming The International Siberian Shelf Study (ISSS) announced on 27 October that its team aboard the Russian research ship R/V Akademik Keldysh have found evidence that huge frozen methane deposits are starting to be released over a large area off the East Siberian coast. This would be the third such find in the region. Methane is a greenhouse gas 86 times more potent over a 20-year period than carbon dioxide according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change High levels of methane have been detected down to a depth of 350 metres in the Laptev Sea, and on the surface, it was present 4 to 8 times more than would normally be expected and was venting into the atmosphere, despite most of the methane bubbles dissolving in the water. The Laptev Sea has already been in headlines on the 24 October for in the first time in recorded history not freezing by late October. Swedish scientist Örjan Gustafsson stated that while at this point there is unlikely to be any major impact on global warming from the methane release yet, the process had been triggered for a continual amount to be released into the atmosphere over time. Researchers are worried this has created a climate feedback loop which will accelerate global warming. The United States Geological Survey has previously listed this process, known as Arctic hydrate destabilization, as one of the four most serious scenarios for abrupt climate change. 5) Eco-friendly autonomous mapping of the Arctic’s depths Four autonomous vessels head back to California after successfully mapping the Arctic’s seafloor The Arctic is not yet a hospitable territory for ships, making mapping its seafloor as precisely as other global seas difficult, leading to a lack of accurate knowledge about the topography of the area. This may be about to start to change, with the announcement on 31 October of the successful completion of a collaborative mission led by Saildrone and the USA’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric survey partner TerraSond to map the Northwest Passage’s seafloor topography with an eye to it’s increasing viability as a shorter alternative shipping route between Asia, North America and Europe. The more precise maps are hoped to protect both future shipping and wildlife and are important to the passage’s commercial viability as currently shipping insurance brokers lack the data required to confidently assure ships they’d be completely covered in case of incident. Meaning while the route is shorter and growing ever more viable due to a warming climate, it may not be favoured by shipping companies until this is rectified. The ‘saildrones’ are 23 feet long, lacked crews and were powered only by the wind and sun. They launched from San Francisco Bay and sailed successfully all the way through the Aleutian Islands and Bering Strait to the Canadian Border. On the way they used single-beam echo sounder technology to map the seafloor at 65 and 164 feet, and despite concerns about the dwindling sunlight to be found in the Arctic to power them, they successfully completed their 8000-nautical-mile mapping mission and are currently on route back to California, in a triumph for the technologies application in the far north.

Kier Starmer's decision today to suspend and remove the whip from former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn has played well with all sections of the British public according to the first polling on the issue by YouGov. Only 13% of the British public see it as a bad decision, 58% were in favour and 29% had no opinion. More importantly perhaps, most 2019 Labour voters are on board with Starmer, 41% to 26%, with again 'Don't Knows' being the second most popular category. Starmer thus has potentially a stable base from which to wage a civil war against Labour's far-left if needed. Indeed the potential warning for Momentum and other Corbyn supporting groups here should be that the more they attack Starmer, and the more Starmer moves against them- the more electable Starmer will become. Particularly as the Conservative category should not be ignored here- 80% of whom support Starmer's decision. Among their number are former Red Wall voters who voted Conservative for the first time in 2019, and who Labour need to re-convince if they are to achieve electoral success and begin to break down Boris Johnson's majority of 80, as most of the 43 former Red Wall seats are marginals. Of course there is an element of chaos in this for Starmer, that being any potential successful legal challenge or appeal by Corbyn- it's currently not crystal clear just how shorne up Starmer's position is in banning Corbyn as there is a case to be made that while he contradicted the leaders stance (though he got his message out on the ECHR findings prior to Starmer- in itself an arguable challenge from a backbench position). he hasn't actually clearly broken any of the party rules. If then it proves Starmer acted in haste, he may end up looking weaker than when he went in, and will have burned significant bridges in any attempt to act as a 'unifier'. In the larger picture then best laid plans do not survive contact with the enemy. Kier Starmer may start a Labour civil war riding high, but the 'events' during it, could wildly derail things for him. Much depends then on what the Corbyn supports among the parliamentary party decide to do over the next few days. Certainly the previous example of ChangeUK and its destruction in the First Past the Post environment will act as a warning over splitting, it will depend then on who can seize control of the inevitable Labour conference to discuss how to tackle Starmer's promise to implement the ECHR findings in full.

Accessible Moon water! NASA announced today that it's Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) telescope has found accessible water on the Moon on its sunlit surface that astronauts can use. The announcement here . This has so many implications from a scientific perspective, which i am ill equipped to comment on beyond saying it's a radical game changer to the previously believed inaccessible ice-cap water that was all the Moon was previously thought to contain in the best case scenario. Luckily for us though this event also has significant geopolitical consequences, which i can muse about. Space Race 2- The context There has been a growing 'space race' over the past few years, though unlike the previous Cold War one, this was started not by states, but by private companies, and more accurately billionaires- Elon Musk, Richard Branson, and Jeff Bezo , beginning from 2000 with the latters Blue Origin private space company . They all see the commercial opportunities that space exploration and exploitation presents, both in the short-medium term where we talk about things like Satellite navigation and GPS, communications, orbital tourism, mapping, inter-orbit cargo transport and waste disposal. As well as the longer term opportunities presented by space travel, mining and eventual colonization. The current end-game and aim for this stage of the space race is to be the first to successfully establish a Mars colony, with the billionaires appealing to the higher purpose of human survival rather than commercial concerns. However, nation states were happy to let the private sector bear the cost and risk, despite looming issues of space and colony governance if nations allowed space to be a private enterprise free for all, particularly as the 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty, that forms the framework for outer-orbit governance never envisaged private actors leading the way , and so it not concretely applicable to private enterprises. It would take China's ambitious Space program to rekindle the space race among national governments. While the European Space Agency completed its first Lunar Orbit in 2003 , The so-called 'Asian Space Race' between China, Japan and India was key to starting the current scramble. Among other endeavors China launched its first Lunar orbiter in 2007 , as it raced to meet Japan who had achieved this a month earlier , India launched its own in 2008 . While it seemed the US was 'out of the race' this was not quite the case , but certainly under the Obama administration much of NASA's exploration plans were derailed due to cuts disallowing manned spaced exploration beyond orbit, and an arguable lack of serious overall aim. Leading figures like Neil Armstrong would criticize Obama as having devastated US space ambitions. While the Trump administration is far more assertive about the need for the US to partake and 'win' the current Space race, with a promise since 2017 for a second human landing on the moon by 2024 , and NASA to perform an eventual human landing on mars at a later date, the arguable lack of interest previously has meant that China, Japan and the European Union are all well placed to also partake in the race and all have plans to do so . Behind these leading powers though, space exploration is steadily becoming more affordable, and the opportunities (or risks of missing out at least) ever greater. Powers then like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have also made their presence felt, and are planning moon and mars missions. The race to the moon and then mars is truly on. Alongside the main race, their are opportunities for the likes of Britain and Russia to profit from the action, with the former planning to build its own space port (the first of it's kind in Europe) to take advantage of the UK's Polar orbit launch potential. Likewise Russia is key to keeping the International Space Station running , as well as provides launch capacity to nearly all other space agencies- government and private due to its unique geographic position and old but extensive infrastructure. So how does accessible Moon water change things? To understand this, we must first recognize that despite universally decreasing costs due to increased private agency competition in the market from the likes of Blue Origin and Space X, space exploration and specifically rocket launches from earth are still horrendously expensive . A significant cost factor is the amount of fuel that needs to be expended to create enough energy to leave the earths gravitational pull . A moon base however has always offered a potential way to escape this 'tyranny of the rocket equation'. The Moons gravitational pull is radically weaker than the earths, making it far easier for rockets to take off, meaning less fuel is needed. Potentially too Luna launched rockets can take heavier payloads due to requiring less fuel. It significantly cheapens the cost of space exploration and thus also allows more launches to take place in the first place. A more detailed analysis of this can be found here . So the Moon was always a potential prospect to be used as humanities rocket platform and hub for space exploration. However, there would still be a significant cost in transporting the cargo and resources needed to sustain a moon presence AND keep the Moon's space ports functional. A big part of the cost is water , essential for sustaining life, creating oxygen and indeed in creating rocket fuel . Water truly is the 'oil' (in terms of its incredible value) of space. Finding accessible water on the Moon though radically alters its desirability. Now the Moon has water deposits which are significant enough to be mined, and so can provide on-site directly water, oxygen and fuel to both increase its self sufficiency (and thus make Moon bases logistical cheaper), and for rocket launches (making them cheaper too). Meanwhile rockets from earth can either be cheaper (due to water no longer taking up so much space and weight, and can indeed carry different and more other items- meaning less supply runs from Earth will be necessary). The Moon becomes almost a 'must have' prospect as a stepping stone for future space exploration, and we can expect every Space Agency, private or public that is serious about exploring Space to want to establish a Moon base in the best position possible position (currently from this find, the Moon's southern hemisphere). Very quickly 'idealized' plans for further Moon exploration will now become a definite reality. The risks So that's the opportunity- a far more valuable Moon that can help humanity more easily become space-faring. However the increased activity and interest in a newly confirmed strategic celestial object, which contains pockets of a comparatively precious resource (water) in space may lead to increased competition among those partaking in the space race. Mapping the Moon for water will become a main goal, and a means of dividing up territory and resources on the Moon will no doubt happen, with or without official legal sanction. It also isn't like the current Space Race powers have much respect for international agreements. Private corporations are not really bound by major legislation yet, and national governments have tacitly ignored the Outer Space Treaties restrictions on militarizing space . So it's stipulations on ownership of celestial bodies may not hold up all that well, especially as the legal framework for space exploration and exploitation is lagging behind the actual act. The ineffectiveness of international treaties and organizations to prevent de facto moves towards ownership and exploitation can be arguably seen in the Antarctic currently , where despite lip service the Antarctic Treaty System is honoured and broken on the whims of larger powers who seek out loop-holes. Despite though the increasing militarization of space ( China, Russia, US and France have their own dedicated or integrated Space Forces, with more nations scrambling to create an equivalent arm ) making the space race competition far more volatile and potentially dangerous than ever before, it does not stand to reason that humanity is doomed to take its 'Great power competition' and threat of conflict into the stars . Cooperation can and still will be had, space is hostile enough, but water on the moon makes things ever so slightly more complicated politically (just as practically it makes things easier) and increases the need for careful diplomacy, lest a Cold War style race, become a hot war conflict, in space, or on Earth over position and resources.

The first US presidential debate has caused quite a stir. The kindest that has been said of it is that it was " an ill-tempered and at times incomprehensible squabble between two angry septuagenarians who palpably loathe each other ", and the agreed takeaway from even Republican supporters was that there was 'no winner' , indeed it could be said that it was the American people who are the ones who really lost , so poor was the presentation of both Donald Trump and Joe Biden. However this seeming disaster alas does have in political terms a winner and a loser, and arguably Trump and his campaign team played a winning gambit (whether they meant to or not...). Trump managed to neuter the debate being a vehicle for Biden to prove himself a statesman and denied him the opportunity to neutralize Trump's 'sleepy Joe' campaign strategy, while Trump being as everyone expected him to be, politically lost nothing at all. To understand this, we need to remind ourselves of the Trump campaigns broader strategy- the narrative of 'sleepy Joe' , a moniker coined by Trump to mock Biden's perceived absence from the campaign trail , and to reinforce the personal attacks Trump and his team have launched questioning Biden's mental fitness to lead to the USA. These sorts of personal attacks have so far defined Trumps campaign style both in 2016 and now, and moreover, Biden's team are aware, and admit at how successful they were in 2016 and can be if let unchallenged . They galvanize Trump's base (naturally), and eat away at swing voter confidence- not necessarily so far as getting them to vote for Trump, but to just not turn out. With Biden already having to tackle the issue that around 14% of Sanders supporters will not not back him , and may choose to not vote, this is an election that might be decided on a knife edge, as while polling shows Biden in the lead fairly consistently , so it did too in 2016- the current polls are not comfortably enough ahead for Biden to breathe a real sigh if relief that he might be in the clear, and national polling fails of course to take into account the particular situation in key swing states where things are far from settled. With this in mind, the first presidential debate was a chance for Biden to directly counter (as he must) the attacks against his mental fitness for the role, by coming across as calm, collected, competent and solid. Giving direct policy answers and painting out clearly his hopes and ambitions for his presidency. His ability to do this is aided by the supposedly very structured format of the debates, with time to answer an array of questions and usually some inkling of what the key issues will be. In this rather 'set piece' affair Biden would have all the advantages to dispel Trump's attack line here by coming across as clear, in control and commanding, and put some clear blue water between them both in the polling by reaching directly to swing voters who while not Trump enthusiasts, might equally have concerns around his ability to be president (and of course to win over potentially 'stay at home' Sanders voters) by showing that he is indeed competent. Indeed it was put around in the media that the debate would be Biden's chance to disprove Trump's claims about him . Far from though Biden being able to do this in a clear way, Trump was himself... he interrupted, bullied, heckled and personally attacked Biden throughout, frequently cutting across Biden's answers and in some cases being able to bring Biden down to his level of squalid debate. So much so indeed did he do this, and the candidates squabbled that t he next debate is looking at putting in special rules to prevent such rudeness and 'cut across' from either candidate by silencing their mic if they attempt to. Trump of course is a polarizing figure, he's also know broadly by his own supporters and opponents as brash, a bully/strong man, and something of an ass, thus his tactics shocked no one, losing him no support. Meanwhile Biden was rattled, he came across as being unclear, long-winded and winding. So whether Trump tactically chose to play into this, or was just himself, we can't really know. But regardless as a tactic is was incredibly successful at lowering the tone of the debate, 'shaking' Biden so that he didn't perform as well as he could have done and he certainly wasn't able to be statesman-like and dispel attacks of 'sleepy Joe', instead he came down to Trump's level (willingly or not) and the consequence has been as in the links I posted above- commentators, politicians, the media and public have all come away from the debate thinking the whole thing was pointless and damaging for all parties, and any chance to shift to polls completely lost . Trump effectively has neutered at least the first debate as being a tool for a Democrat leap to happen, Trump lost nothing by being as everyone expected him to be, Biden lost the chance to prove he's not what Trump paints him as. Whether this works in the second debate with the new rules, we'll have to wait and see. But the first was a tactical victory for Trump.